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SECTION 1
SUMMARY
The objective of this program was to develop an advanced concept for the
Detection, Isolation, and Accommodation (DIA) of sensor failures in gas
turbine engine control systems. Participants in the program were the Commer-
cial Products Division and Government Products Division of Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft Group, and Systems Control, Inc. (Vt.), with sponsorship provided by
NASA Lewis Research Center.
Five advanced concepts were formulated from advanced techniques for detection,
isolation, and accommodation of sensor failures. The concepts were evaluated
by application in an F100 engine and Multivariable Control System simulation.
The F100 Multivariable Control System was developed under Air Force Contract
AFWAL-TR-80-2010. A simplified version of the simulation of the F100 engine
and multivariable control system was used in a screening process to select one
of these advanced concepts. This simplified simulation was also used as the
model for the filters in the various advanced detection, isolation and accom-
modation concepts.
The selected advanced concept utilizes a Weighted Sum-Squared Residuals tech-
nique to detect soft failures. A normal mode Kalman filter; i.e., a filter
designed to use all sensor inputs with no failure assumed on those inputs, is
used to generate the residuals and the estimated measurements. Detection and
isolation of hard-over failures is also accomplished with the normal mode fil-
ter by testing for large values of the individual residuals. Isolation of soft
failures is accomplished by likelihood ratio based testing of innovations from
a bank of Kalman filters, each designed with the assumption of one failed
input. Accommodation is accomplished by reconfiguring the normal mode Kalman
filter to eliminate the failed sensor from the input.
A baseline detection, isolation and accommodation concept was also developed
based upon the conventional techniques of parameter synthesis. Performance of
this concept and the selected advanced concept was evaluated in detail on the
complete nonlinear dynamic simulation of the engine and control system.
Results of the detailed evaluation demonstrated that the advanced concept is a
viable method for a sensor failure detection system. While performance was
generally comparable to that of the parameter synthesis based concept, the
advanced concept represents a more systematic design approach. Given a reason-
ably accurate plant model and sensor failure characteristics, the design of
the various Kalman filters and detection and isolation tests is relatively
straightforward. The parameter synthesis based concept requires significant
trial and error analysis and refinement to develop useful gas generator rela-
tionships and associated logic for detecting, isolating, and accommodating
sensor failures. The evaluation results did show that the simplified model
used for the advanced concept was not accurate enough at a number of flight
operating points. This was found to result from insufficient linearized data
at these flight conditions to constrain the curve fits used in the implementa-
tion of the model. Additional refinement of the simplified model is expected
to provide significant performance improvements of the advanced concept.
SECTION 2
INTRODUCTION
An orderly transition from hydomechanical control systems to full authority
digital electronic control systems is currently in progress throughout the
aircraft propulsion industry. Full authority means that all control logic
functions are provided in the digital computer. The full authority digital
electronic control system will provide increases in turbine life, elimination
of ground trim requirements, improved engine performance, and reduced pilot
workload as a result of the capability to implement accurate control of engine
thrust and temperature ratings.
Other hardware and software features will include a modular construction
approach, automatic trouble-shooting and self test devices, and fault toler-
ance logic. These features will simplify maintenance procedures and thereby
reduce maintenance costs for the control system relative to current hydromech-
anical control systems. Paradoxically, present design philosophy emphasizes
hardware redundancy to attain acceptable levels of mission reliability. This
program addressed software, or analytical redundancy on measured parameters to
provide acceptable mission reliability with minimal sensor hardware redundancy.
The logic programming capability of a full authority digital electronic con-
trol allows the incorporation of fault logic to accomplish three basic func-
tions: 1) computer self-test; 2) actuator interface failure identification;
and 3) sensor failure detection, isolation and accommodation (DIA). Fault
tolerance logic can provide essentially fail operational control capability
with a minimum number of parts and therefore contributes to a reduction in
control related Mean Time Between In-Flight Shutdowns. For military aircraft,
this means improved weapon system availability and mission effectiveness.
Over the past decade of electronic control system development, extensive work
has been accomplished in the areas of developing comprehensive techniques for
computer self-test and actuator interface failure identification. Relatively
simplistic techniques have been applied to the sensor failure DIA problem.
Several techniques are available for the application to the sensor failure DIA
task. For hard-over failures of sensors, simple range-check logic provides the
simplest detection procedure, but redundant sensors, measurement synthesis, or
control mode modification are required to accommodate the failed sensor. Soft
failures, such as sensor drift, and sensor noise require more sophisticated
logic or redundancy of sensors. With triple sensors, voting logic can be im-
plemented to determine sensors with soft failures; however, these redundant
sensors significantly increase control system cost, weight, complexity, and
failure rate.
Therefore, to minimize the impact of hardware redundancy requires the develop-
ment of a software detection, isolation and accommodation concept which can
provide "analytical redundancy" equivalent to having multiple hardware sen-
sors. The conventional approach for accomplishing this is to synthesize values
of measurements from other available parameters in the control system by using
gas generator functional relationships, such as shown in Figure 1. Such syn-
thesized measurements can be compared with single sensor measurements, or with
dual measurements in a voting scheme, to evaluate the health of the sensors. A
tolerance band must be established between synthesized and measured values to
avoid false alarms due to:
o Uncertainty in synthesis curves
o Actuator failure impacts
o Sensor tolerances
o Engine-to-engine tolerances
o Horsepower and bleed extraction variations in-service
o Engine deterioration
o Transient versus steady state conditions
The effort to develop the parameter synthesis technique and to minimize the
required tolerance band to accommodate these effects can be substantial.
More sophisticated concepts such as the Kalman filter, whose typical implemen-
tation is shown in Figure 2, have also been suggested for the gas turbine sen-
sor failure problem. Such techniques may offer a more systematic approach to
the design of an effective sensor detection, isolation and accommodation con-
cept and can automatically accommodate, in theory, many of the above varia-
tions which require a tolerance band for the parameter synthesis technique.
However, basic research in this area has resulted in a proliferation of such
advanced techniques. It is not obvious which of these techniques can be suc-
cessfully applied to the gas turbine engine sensor problem and result in a
sensor failure detection, isolation and accommodation concept which performs
better than the conventional parameter synthesis approach.
To evaluate the applicability of the advanced detection, isolation and accom-
modation concepts to gas turbine engines, NASA Lewis Research Center sponsored
the program which is the subject of this report. To accomplish the program
goals, a team was established, consisting of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Commer-
cial and Government Products Division and Systems Control Inc. (Vt), (SCI) of
California, with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Commercial Products Division (CPD)
being the prime contractor. Figure 3 shows the team members' primary responsi-
bilities for this program. This program utilized the F100 engine and F100
Multivariable Control (MVC) logic (described in Section 3.1), developed under
Air Force contract, as the test bed system for concept evaluation.
A summary of the complete program is presented in the following paragraphs:
The types of sensors to be used for the engine parameters required in the F100
Multivariable Control System were selected. Typical state-of-the-art transdu-
cers were selected to ensure a realistic definition of the sensor failure
modes and characteristics. Sensor failure characteristics for the selected
sensor types were defined and quantified according to the predominant failure
categories of out-of-range, drift, and noise. This task is described in detail
in Section 3.2.
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Figure 1 Examples of Synthesis of a Parameter from Gas Generator Character-
istics - Compressor discharge temperature may be synthesized from a
functional relationship between corrected rotor speed, pressure
ratio, and compressor inlet temperature.
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A Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was conducted using
the F100 Multivariable Control System simulation. Each sensor failure was
evaluated at 15 flight operating points. This provided the necessary informa-
tion to classify the various failure modes into categories of critical and
non-critical failures. Critical failures are defined as any failure which
results in a fan or compressor surge, excessive thrust variation (greater than
10%) or a rotor overspeed above the operating limits. A detailed description
and the results of this study are included in Section 3.3.
A Detection, Isolation and Accommodation (DIA) concept scoring system was
developed which quantitatively and qualitatively evaluates the candidate con-
cept for:
1. DIA Criteria
2. DIA Detection Performance
3. DIA Figures of Merit
The DIA criteria are defined as the set of transient and steady state opera-
tional requirements which the propulsion system must satisfy in the event of
various potential sensor failures in order to meet minimum aircraft operation-
al requirements. DIA Detection Performance relates to how effective the con-
cept is in terms of detecting and isolating a sensor failure. In other words,
if the DIA concept has excellent accommodation capability, but cannot consis-
tently detect failures, then it is not a good concept. The DIA figures of
merit are more qualitative in nature, and are defined as the benefits of
bettering DIA criteria in the event of single failures or meeting criteria in
the event of multiple sensor failures. The details of the evaluation approach
and the evaluation results are described in Section 3.4.
Available techniques for detection, isolation, and accommodation were reviewed
to determine which techniques or combination of techniques yield detection,
isolation and accommodation concepts having a theoretical basis applicable to
the turbine engine sensor failure problem. From this review, a set of five
candidate concepts was selected. These concepts were formulated to span as
many of the applicable techniques as possible. The advanced detection,
isolation and accommodation techniques which were reviewed are discussed in
Section 4.3.
A simplified F100 engine simulation was constructed for use in screening the
five concepts in order to minimize computer run times. The simplified simula-
tion consists of a fourth order state variable model augmented with nonlinear
steady state relationships to result in an accurate representation of nonlin-
ear engine characteristics. The details of the development of the simplified
nonlinear model are discussed in Section 4.2. The five candidate concepts were
implemented in the simplified simulation and evaluated relative to performance
for single sensor failures. Using the detection, isolation and accommodation
scoring system, each candidate concept was quantitatively evaluated on its
ability to detect, isolate and accommodate the single sensor failures as well
as on their ability to satisfy the criteria as previously described. Two
concepts were selected from this initial screening process. A more detailed
analysis was conducted on these two concepts. This evaluation led to the
selection of one concept for implementation and evaluation on the detailed
nonlinear F100 engine. Results of the concept evaluation process are presented
in Section 4.4.
In addition to investigating advanced detection, isolation and accommodation
concepts, an algorithm, based upon conventional Parameter Synthesis techni-
ques, was developed as a baseline system for evaluating the performance of the
selected advanced concept. The parameter synthesis based algorithm is descri-
bed in Section 4.1
A detailed evaluation of the parameter synthesis based algorithm and advanced
concept detection, isolation and accommodation algorithm was conducted by
simulating sensor failures for both steady state and transient operation at
the 15 flight operating points, using the nonlinear F100 Multivariable Control
System simulation. The evaluation results of the two algorithms were compared
to determine the benefits of implementing advanced algorithms in production
control systems, rather than the conventional parameter synthesis techniques
currently used. The results of this comparison are presented in Section 5.
SECTION 3.0
PROBLEM DEFINITION
The initial portion of this program was concerned with defining and character-
izing the subject engine control system sensor failures and developing a
scoring system for evaluating advanced detection, isolation and accommodation
concepts. This effort as shown in Figure 4 involved a review of the FIDO
Multivariable Control (MVC) System requirements, defining the sensor types to
be used and determining the various failure modes of those sensors. A Failure
Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was performed to determine the
impact of a sensor failure on engine operation and thereby establish which
sensors are critical. Detection, isolation and accommodation criteria, figures
of merit, and an overall evaluation methodology were established to provide a
quantitative basis for concept selection.
The following paragraphs present a detailed description of this portion of the
program.
3.1 F100 ENGINE AND MULTIVARIABLE CONTROL MODE DESCRIPTION
The engine selected as a testbed system for evaluating sensor failure Detec-
tion, Isolation, and Accommodation (DIA) concepts is a Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft F100 afterburning turbofan, representative of current high technology
engines. The FIDO is low bypass ratio, twin-spool, axial-flow turbofan engine,
consisting of the following components:
o Three-stage fan driven by a two stage turbine
o Ten-stage compressor driven by an aircooled two-stage turbine
o Main burner with an annular chamber
o Annular fan duct that surrounds the basic gas generator and dis-
charges air in the mixed flow augmentor.
o Variable area nozzle
An inlet guide vane with a movable trailing edge to achieve variable airfoil
camber is used ahead of the fan to improve inlet distortion tolerance and fan
efficiency. The first three stators of the high compressor are variable to
improve starting and high Mach number characteristics. Airflow bleed is ex-
tracted at the compressor exit for installation requirements and starting. The
exhaust nozzle for the engine is a balance beam design with actuated divergent
flap. The variable geometry of the balanced-beam nozzle enables all three
nozzle performance parameters (nozzle area, expansion ratio, and boattail
drag) to be simultaneously near optimum throughout the operating range.
REVIEW F100/MVCS REQUIREMENTS
SELECT SENSOR
TRANSDUCER TYPES
SELECT 15 OPERATING
POINTS
PERFORM FAILURE MODE
AND EFFECTS CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
IDENTIFY FAILURE MODES
DETERMINE LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCES
DETERMINE SEVERITY OF IMPACT ON ENGINE
IDENTIFY CRITICAL SENSORS
ESTABLISH DIA CRITERIA,
DETECTION PERFORMANCE
AND FIGURES OF MERIT
Figure 4 Task I Failure Definition Procedure
The engine simulation includes a simulation of the multivariable control mode.
This control mode was developed by Systems Control, Inc. and Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft under the FIDO Multivariable Control Synthesis Program (Air Force
Contract No. AFWAL-TR-80-2010) w-hich was funded as a cooperative effort be-
tween the Air Force Aero Propulsion Laboratory and NASA Lewis Research Center.
A simplified block diagram of the FIDO multivariable control system is shown
in Figure 5. The control mode is basically proportional plus integral with a
feed-forward path to provide rapid response. The proportional control action
is provided by the Linear Quadratic Regulator, (LQR) with the regulator gains
Cp able to affect changes in all of the available control variables U to
reduce deviations in all of the state variables X relative to the specified
reference point Xnom
multivariable control
The state, control
are as follows:
and output variables used in the
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Figure 5 Simplified Block Diagram of F100 Multivariable Control System
The feedback law itself represents an optimal regulator structure with inte-
gral trims for steady-state accuracy and a model following implementation to
prevent saturation during transients. Each element of the control law is
described briefly below.
The control law is written for small perturbations of state and control vari-
ables about an equilibrium condition. The equilibrium conditions must be deri-
ved approximately by the controller given the requested power level, altitude,
Mach number, engine face pressure and temperature. A functional (or tabular)
description of these equilibrium conditions is a reference point schedule.
The reference schedules are produced by calculating the thermodynamic equili-
brium associated with a given control vector at a representative group of sub-
sonic and supersonic flight points. Nondimensionalized quantities were then
utilized to fit approximate reference points with minimum complexity.
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When a large transition in power is requested by the pilot, the small pertur-
bation character assumed in the regulator design is lost. A large change in
the reference state vector will cause large commanded inputs. This tends to
saturate actuators and produce significantly nonlinear behavior unless a feed
forward control input is provided. The transition control generates this sig-
nal. A regulator can then be used to track the compatible trajectory taking
the system from one state to another.
The dynamic response of the engine is affected strongly by the air mass flow.
Power level, altitude and Mach number determine this mass flow and the re-
sponse. The linearized control synthesis procedure produces regulator gains
that control the engine satisfactorily in the neighborhood of the design
flight/power point. To implement a continuous envelope-wide controller, the
gains are varied as the system makes the transition from one condition to
another.
The gain scheduling adopted for the FIDO implementation approximately fits
important gain elements with univariate functions of the engine face density
and rotor speed. The former variable accounts for altitude effects, while the
latter schedules the power condition. Dominant gain elements were determined
by assessing the closed-loop ergenvalue sensitivity of the system to each gain
element and eliminating those that do not affect closed-loop response.
The engine set-point is a group of reference values of states and controls
which the engine must attain exactly in steady-state. These values define the
equilibrium point. Error terms are calculated between these reference values
and corresponding sensed values. These error terms always are integrated
unless the associated control variables are driven transiently into satura-
tion. To avoid integrator wind-up due to this uncontrollable situation, the
appropriate error is switched out until the transient command tends to cause
the control to unsaturate. This switching logic provides smooth and controlled
engine transition for changes in power and flight condition.
The engine protection logic provides hard limits on the commands to the con-
trol actuators. The engine protection logic includes fuel flow, variable vane,
bleed air and exhaust nozzle area limits. Whenever a commanded actuator posi-
tion exceeds a specified limit or when a control saturation is detected, a
flag is set with the control logic. These flags send a signal within the logic
to clamp and hold the appropriate trim integrator to prevent integrator
wind-up.
Temperature limiting during transient and steady-state operation is a critical
function of any turbine engine control system. For the F100, the maximum tem-
peratures specified for compressor discharge and turbine inlet stations in the
gas path are implicitly limited by the maximum fan turbine inlet temperature
(FTIT). The fan turbine inlet temperature sensor output response is extremely
slow relative to the temperature overshoot criteria, however. Compensation of
this signal was, therefore, required to provide adequate temperature limiting
during transient maneuvers. For the FIDO Multivariable Control System program,
this was implemented with a steady-state, third-order filter to estimate fan
turbine inlet temperature. For the Sensor Failure Detection System program,
this filter was eliminated since fan turbine inlet temperature was one of the
variables used in the advanced detection, isolation, and accommodation algo-
rithm.
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3.2 SELECTED SENSOR SET AND FAILURE CLASSIFICATIONS
3.2.1 Selection of Sensor Set
A list of the required engine sensors and sensor types was compiled for FIDO
Multivariable Control (MVC) application.Typical state-of-the-art sensors were
selected for the engine parameters to ensure the best chance of defining
realistic sensor failure modes and characteristics. Sensor selection was also
directed toward satisfying hardware requirements such as availability, cost,
reliability, durability and system compatability. A list of the sensed vari-
ables and associated sensor types is shown in Table I.
The advanced Detection, Isolation and Accommodation algorithms and the para-
meter synthesis based algorithm developed for this program were designed to
detect, isolate and accommodate failures of the PT6, PT4, Ml, N2, and fan
turbine inlet temperature sensors. These parameters were selected since they
are basic feedback parameters in the Multivariable Control Mode.
3.2.2 Sensor Failure Classification
Sensor failure rates and failure modes were defined for the selected sensor
set. The failure rates for each type of sensor and its associated electrical
harness were obtained from historical U. S. Air Force records for the FIDO
military engine and from failure mode and effects analysis conducted by Pratt
& Whitney Aircraft and component vendors in support of other electronic
control development programs.
TABLE I
ENGINE PARAMETER SENSOR LIST
Multivariable Control for the F100 Engine
Sensed Variable Symbol Sensor Type
Engine Face Temperature TT2 Thermocouple
Engine Face Pressure PT2 Vibrating Cylinder
Fan Discharge Temperature TT25 Thermocouple
Fan Speed Nl Magnetic Pickup
Compressor Speed N2 Alternator Winding
Burner Pressure PT4 Vibrating Cylinder
Fan Turbine Inlet Temperature FTIT Thermocouples
Augmentor Total Pressure PT6 Vibrating Cylinder
Jet Area Servo Stroke AJ Resolver
Compressor Inlet Variable Vane Angle CIYV Resolver
Rear Compressor Variable Vane Angle RCVV Resolver
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In a military configuration, the typical short flight mission may not allow
adequate time for an accurate diagnosis of control system problems. In addi-
tion, the increased complexity of the high performance control system required
for an application such as the FIDO engine can often result in misdiagnosis of
system problems. Since the component is charged with a failure when it is
removed and replaced, a misdiagnosis problem may unjustifiably increase the
failure rate of an individual component in military records. In addition, the
temperature and vibration environment experienced with a military application
are more severe than with a commerical application. Therefore, the failure
rates may differ from those recorded for commercial control systems.
The sensor failure rates were broken down into the predominant failure cate-
gories of out-of-range, drift, and noise. The failure category of noise
consists of all unconfirmed in-range intermittent failures. Block diagrams of
the sensor configurations and their associated fai-lure rates are shown in
Figures 6 through 10 and summarized in Table II. The predominant causes of
in-range sensor failures are presented in Appendix A.
As shown on Table II, the total failure rate for one complete set of sensors
required for the multivariable control application is 406 failures per million
hours. To put this number in perspective, the failure rate of a total multi-
variable control system (including all control components such as pumps, igni-
tion system, actuators, etc.) with sensor hardware redundancy is 3706 failures
per million hours. By replacing one set of the redundant sensors with analy-
tical redundancy (advanced concepts), the total system failure rate would be
reduced from 3706 to 3300 failures per million hours. Therefore, incorporating
advanced concepts to detect, isolate, and accommodate sensor failures has a
potential for reducing the total control system failure rate by approximately
11*.
TABLE II
SENSOR FAILURE RATES
c _ _
Sensor Failure Rate/ Out of Drift % Noise %
Million Hours Range
N l 2 2 9 3 1 6
N2 22 80 10 10
TT2 43 87 12 1
FTIT 222 20 79 1
PT2 18 89 10 1
PT6 18 89 10 1
Pb 18 89 10 1
TT2.5 _43 87 12 1
406
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3.3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
3.3.1 Introduction
An engine sensor Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was
conducted with the objective of dividing the sensor set into critical and
non-critical sensors. This allows proper emphasis to be placed upon developing
concepts which can provide good detection, isolation and accommodation of
failures of critical sensors.
A list of the required engine sensors and sensor types was compiled for F100
Multivariable Control (MVC) application as described in Section 3.2 The sensor
types were selected to satisfy the accuracy and environmental requirements of
the system. Using this selected sensor set, sensor failure characteristics
were defined, including modes of failure, such as drift, out-of-range fail-
ures, and a failure category referred to as noise, which includes unconfirmed
in-range intermittent failures. The magnitude of allowable sensor drift and
the failure rates for the different failure modes were also determined during
this study.
The impact of these sensor failure characteristics was evaluated on the non-
linear dynamic simulation of the F100 multivariable control system. This
evaluation was accomplished at the fifteen (15) flight operating points selec-
ted for the detection, isolation, and accommodation concept evaluation to
determine the impact on steady state and transient engine performance.
3.3.2 Impact of Out-of-Range Failures on Steady State Operation
Computer analysis, using the detailed nonlinear F100 multivariable control
simulation, was conducted to determine the effects of out-of-range sensor
failures on gas generator operation. Out-of-range sensor failures for each
input sensor were simulated at the flight operating points by individually
failing the sensors to their high and low range limits, and observing the
steady state results. The results of this study are shown in Appendix A.
All out-of-range failures can exhibit critical failure characteristics at some
of the flight operating points. Critical failures were defined as failures
that result in a fan or compressor surge, excessive thrust variation (greater
than 10%), or a rotor overspeed above the operating limits.
3.3.3 Impact of In-Range Sensor Failures on Steady State Operation
The impact of in-range sensor failures on steady state operation was also
evaluated on the nonlinear simulation. As previously discussed, an in-range
sensor failure can result in sensor drift anywhere between the accuracy of the
sensor to the out-of-range limit. Therefore, a study was conducted to examine
various levels of drift at each flight operating point, for each sensor, to
determine the minimum drift which would cause a critical failure situation;
i.e., the minimum drift that a detection, isolation and accommodation algo-
rithm must be capable of detecting. The flight operating points reflect those
conditions which exhibit the most severe consequences to out-of-range fail-
ures. The results are summarized in Table III.
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TABLE III
MINIMUM SENSOR DRIFT FOR A CRITICAL FAILURE SITUATION
Sensor Flight Operating Points Minimum Drift
"(% of PoinfT
N2 20K ft/.30Mn, 83° PLA 3.4% (423 rpm)
T2 10K ft/.9Mn, 83° PLA 74% (76°F)
PT2 0 ft/1.2Mn, 83° PLA 16.9% (6 psi)
PT6 0 ft/OMn, 20° PLA 113% (18 psi)
FTIT 65K ft/2.5Mn, 83° PLA 2.7% (45°F)
PT4 0 ft/OMn, 83° PLA 22% (80 psi)
T25 0 ft/OMn, 20° PLA 70% (70°F)
The Nl drifts were not considered in this study, since an in-range failure of
this sensor is very unlikely (.22 failures/million hours). For a fan turbine
inlet temperature in-range drift, critical failure characteristics will occur
for all failures where the sensed temperature drifts to a fixed temperature
above the control limit. This failure would result in a constant negative
error term in the protection loop, causing fuel flow to drive down, resulting
in excessive thrust loss.
A fan turbine inlet temperature in-range sensor drift could also exhibit
critical failure characteristics for those failures where the sensed tempera-
ture drifts to a fixed temperature below the control limit. This failure mode
would increase fuel flow and produce overtemperaturing of the turbine at the
flight operating points in which the engine normally operates near the
temperature limit.
3.3.4 Effect of Operating With Failures During Transient Operation
Power lever transients were run with out-of-range failures at those flight
conditions where, in steady state, the failure produced marginally critical
engine operation. These results showed more severe failure consequences trans-
iently than in steady state. This reconfirmed the need to evaluate the detec-
tion, isolation and accommodation algorithms transiently, as well as in steady
state. An example of transient operation is shown on Figure 11. The dashed
line on this figure shows the effects on compressor surge margin resulting
from failing the PT6 sensor out-of-range to its upper limit at idle power. The
solid line shows the same failure at military power followed by a snap decel
to idle occurring at five (5) seconds. This illustrates significantly greater
loss of compressor surge margin during the snap decel to idle than in the
steady state idle failure case.
3.3.5 Effects of Intermittent In-Range Sensor Failures
In-range intermittent sensor failure, which is referred to as noise for the
purposes of this study, was considered for the failure mode and effects
criticality analysis. However, upon examining field service data, it was found
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that this failure category encompasses all unconfirmed intermittent failures
reported mostly by pilot complaint. Therefore, very little quantitative data
existed which made it very difficult to model. In addition, the failure rates
for this category were shown to have a low probability of occurrence for the
pressure and temperature sensors. It was therefore decided not to include this
failure category in the analysis.
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Figure 11 Typical Transient Operation - PT6 Sensor Failed Out-of-Range
3.3.6 Effects of Multiple Failures
After completing the single failure portion of the failure mode and effects
criticality analysis, it was obvious that including multiple sensor failures
would not be a meaningful addition to the study. This became apparent when all
single sensor failures were shown to exhibit critical failure characteristics.
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3.3.7 Summary of Results
A summary of the failure mode and effects criticality analysis results is
shown in Table IV. This table illustrates that all out-of-range failures
exhibit critical failure characteristics, where criticality is as defined in
Section 3.3.2. In-range failures (drifts) of the N2, TT2, TT25, FTIT, PT2, PT6
and PT4 sensors are also shown to exhibit critical failure characteristics.
The in-range failure rates of the Nl sensor and the pressure sensors are low.
For out-of-range failures simple range tests can be used effectively for
detection and isolation. For in-range failures, however, advanced detection,
isolation and accommodation algorithms may be required to insure continued
operation in the event of sensor failures. Therefore, less emphasis could be
placed on developing in-range failure detection capability for these sensors
than on the N2 sensor and the temperature sensors. In-range failures of the
fan turbine inlet temperature sensor were shown to exhibit critical failure
characteristics for the smallest magnitude of sensor drift, in addition to
having the highest failure rate. Therefore, this sensor warrants an accurate
algorithm.
TABLE IV
FMECA SUMMARY
OUT-OF-RANGE FAILURES IN-RANGE DRIFTS
Sensor
Nl
N2
TT2
FTIT
PT2
PT6
Pb
TT2.5
Failure Rate
/Mil Mrs
20.5
17.6
37.4
44
16
16
16
37.4
Failure
Classif 'n
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Failure Rate
Failure/Mil Hrs
0.22
2.2
5.2
175.4
1.8
1.8
1.8
5.2
Minimum
Drift*
3.4% (423RPM)
74% (76°F)
2.7% (45°F)
16.9% (6 PSI)
113% (18.6 PSI)
22% (80 PSI)
70% (70°F)
Failure
Classif 'n
Unlikely
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
* This is the minimum sensor drift in terms of % of point for which critical
engine operation was observed.
For this program, the detection, isolation and accommodation algorithms were
developed for the PT6, PT4, Nl, N2, and fan turbine inlet temperature sensors
to result in a sufficiently complex problem to be a good test of the advanced
concepts.
3.4 DETECTION, ISOLATION AND ACCOMMODATION CRITERIA, DETECTION PERFORMANCE.
AND FIGURES OF MERIT
3.4.1 Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Criteria
High performance turbine engines, such as the FIDO, operate at or near design
limits with tight control of speed, pressure, temperature and airflow to
achieve maximumm performance while maintaining engine durability. Basically,
control requirements as applied to these engines consist of exhibiting desired
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transient and steady-state responses while remaining within safe margins of
engine thermal, aerodynamic and mechanical limits throughout flight envelope
operation. These requirements were combined to create a design criteria list
to apply in the design of detection, isolation, and accommodation concepts.
The criteria used in the design of the concepts include the following:
1. Maintaining critical engine parameter limits
o Maximum Fan Turbine Inlet Temperature
o Maximum High Rotor Speed
o Maximum Low Rotor Speed
o Maximum and Minimum Burner Pressure
2. Maintaining safe fan and compressor surge margins
3. Minimal steady state deviations from nominal
4. Acceleration requirement
o Minimize time to 90% thrust variation
o Minimize overshoot of Engine Pressure Ratio and Low Rotor Speed
The detection, isolation and accommodation criteria were incorporated in a
scoring system (as described in Section 3.5 ) to quantitatively evaluate the
candidate advanced concepts.
3.4.2 Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Detection Performance
The detection performance relates to how effective the concept is in detecting
a sensor failure. For example, if a concept has excellent accommodation
capacity but cannot consistently detect failures then it is not a good concept.
The response of the concept in detecting various induced failures was quanti-
fied in the following terms: Hit; Miss; False Alarm; and Response Time. The
definitions of these terms are:
Hit: A sensor failure(s) occurs and detection, isolation
and accommodation are accomplished by the chosen
concept;
Miss: The concept detects no failure(s) for which it was
programmed despite the fact that such a failure(s)
was induced.
False Alarm: A condition in which the concept incorrectly
detects a sensor failure(s) when none has actually
occurred.
Response Time: Length of time after failure before detection of
the failure occurs.
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As with the detection, isolation, and accommodation criteria, mathematical
equations were generated (as described in Section 3.5 ) to quantitatively
evaluate the detection performance of the candidate advanced concepts.
3.4.3 Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Figures of Merit
The DIA figures of merit generated for the evaluation of the candidate con-
cepts are more qualitative than the DIA Criteria or Detection Performance. The
figures of merit are defined as the benefits of bettering the detection,
isolation and accommodation criteria in the event of a single sensor failure
or meeting the DIA criteria in the event of multiple sensor failures. The DIA
figures of merit used in evaluating the concepts included the following:
1. Accommodation of multiple sensor failures
2. Complexity of software computation and implementation (core size,
cycle time, control mode interactions and dependence, etc.)
3. Robustness (sensitivity to model errors)
4. Sensitivity to noise and disturbances
3.5 SCORING SYSTEM
A scoring system was developed for use in evaluation of the candidate detec-
tion, isolation, and accommodation concepts. The scoring system evaluates each
concept on how well it detects, isolates, and accommodates sensor failures.
The accommodation criteria used in developing the scoring system was a set of
transient and steady state operational requirements which the propulsion
system must satisfy to meet minimum aircraft operational requirements in the
event of various potential sensor failures. The accommodation criteria used in
this study penalizes the concept for:
1. Exceeding critical engine protection parameter
o FTIT limit
o N2 speed 1imit
o Nl speed limit
o PT4 pressure limit
2. Decrease in fan compressor surge margins
3. Steady state accuracy deviations
4. Acceleration requirement
o Excessive time to 90% thrust variation
o Excessive Engine Pressure Ratio or Low rotor speed overshoot
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The DIA detection performance relates to how effective the DIA concept is in
detecting a sensor failure. This portion of the scoring system evaluates each
DIA concept on time to detect a failure, the hit/miss ratio, and the number of
false alarms.
Mathematical equations were derived which incorporate both the accommodation
and detection criteria. These are presented in Appendix B. The scoring system
was used in the initial detection, isolation and accommodation concept screen-
ing process to select the most desirable concept. The results of the scoring
of the concepts are shown in Section 4.4.
3.6 SELECTION OF FLIGHT OPERATING CONDITIONS
A set of fifteen flight operating points were selected to be used as the eval-
uation conditions for the selected advanced detection, isolation, and accommo-
dation algorithm and the baseline parameter synthesis algorithm. These flight
operating points were chosen to span the F-15 aircraft flight envelope and to
demonstrate the algorithm detection and accommodation performance at condi-
tions where critical stability and engine parameter limits are encountered.
The points were also selected to include,
altitude stand test points which were run
shows the selected flight operating points
the individual conditions. Figure 12 shows
tive to an F-15 aircraft flight envelope
where possible, many of the NASA
during previous programs. Table V
and the criterion used to select
the flight operating points rela-
and illustrates that the selected
conditions span a considerable portion of the-engine flight envelope.
TABLE V
FLIGHT OPERATING CONDITIONS
Point
1
2
3
4
5*
6
7
8*
9*
10*
11*
12
13
14
15
Mach
Number
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.2
0.9
0.3
0.3
1.8
1.9
0.9
0.9
2.2
1.2
2.5
2.5
Altitude
x 10'3Ft
0
0
0
0
10
20
20
24
34
45
50
54
65
65
65
PLA
20
83
130
83
83
24
83
83
83
40
83
130
83
83
130
Selection Criterion
Sea
Sea
Sea
Max
Max
Operating Line
Operating Line
Operating Line
PT4, Nl, N2, P2
Level
Level
Level
T4, q,
T4
Lower PT4 Limit
Fan Stability Verification
Max Nl, T3, T4
T4 Limit, Compressor Stability
Min PT4, Low Power Altitude Operation
Rating Point
Supersonic Cruise
Fan Stability Verification
Compressor Stability Verification
Max Augmentation
*NASA test points
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• Pt 12
Altitude
Pts 1, 2, 3
* Pts 14. 15
Pt4
Mach number
Figure 12 Selected Flight Operating Conditions
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Section 4.0
CONCEPT FORMULATION
A survey was made of the available Detection, Isolation, and Accommodation
techniques as described in technical literature. Five advanced sensor failure
concepts, applicable to gas turbine engines, were formulated from the results
of the survey. A simplified engine model was developed and used as a testbed
for screening the candidate concepts. Various test cases were run to quantita-
tively evaluate the candidate concepts using the scoring system developed in
section 3.5. This resulted in the selection of one concept for detailed
evaluation. The detailed evaluation will be discussed in Section 5.
As a parallel effort to the development of the advanced detection, isolation
and accommodation concepts, a baseline detection, isolation and accommodation
algorithm was developed based upon conventional parameter synthesis techni-
ques. The parameter synthesis based algorithm was evaluated in the same manner
as the selected advanced detection, isolation and accommodation algorithm to
provide a basis of comparison (as discussed in Section 6).
The development of the parameter synthesis concept, the simplified engine
model, and the five selected advanced detection, isolation and accommodation
concepts will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.1 PARAMETER SYNTHESIS
A sensor failure detection, isolation, and accommodation algorithm was devel-
oped based upon conventional parameter synthesis techniques. This algorithm
was used as a baseline for comparison with the selected advanced algorithm.
Comparing the performance of the two algorithms shows the value of using ad-
vanced concepts for production control systems. If the advanced DIA concept is
of similar complexity to the parameter synthesis technique, but yields signi-
ficantly better detection, isolation, and accommodation of failed sensors,
then it would be desireable for implementation in production control systems.
The results of this comparison are presented in Section 5.
The concept of parameter synthesis uses engine component relationships to com-
pute synthesized values of measured parameters from other measured parameters.
Generating these synthesized values provides the information to detect, iso-
late, and accommodate sensor failures. The following paragraphs describe the
development of the engine component relationships and the design of the logic
used to detect and isolate sensor failures.
Engine component relationships of the F100 engine were studied to obtain a set
of curves potentially capable of synthesizing other measured parameters within
the control system. The F100 engine and Multivariable Control (MVC) nonlinear
simulation was programmed to run steady-state engine operating data from idle
to full afterburner power at the flight operating conditions chosen for this
study. Over sixty viable engine component relationships were computer plotted
for all flight operating conditions to provide composite plots of the various
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relationships. These plots were examined to eliminate those which did not form
a relatively unique curve or a family of curves related by a bias measured
within the control system, i.e., it is desireable to use simple curves to keep
the algorithm complexity to a minimum. The remaining engine component rela-
tionships were judged for ease and accuracy of implementation, transient
accuracy, and engine to engine variations and deterioration effects to arrive
at the final curve set shown in Figure 13.
These engine component relationships can be used to detect, isolate, and
accommodate PT6, PT4, Nl, N2 and FTIT sensor failures. The detection and
isolation functions are performed by comparing the difference between the
synthesized values and measured values to predetermined tolerance bands; one
or more of the synthesized values being out of tolerance with the measurements
indicates (detects) a sensor failure.
The tolerance bands used for this study were derived by summing the produc-
tion/deterioration variation of the relationship with the curve read inaccur-
acies. The production/deterioration portion of the tolerance band was derived
by computer plotting actual engine data from sea level engine tests of seventy
recent production engines in the same format as the parameter synthesis
curves. This was done at five part power points to observe if the data scatter
varies with power level. The tolerance bands were sized based upon a 2 sigma
statistical variation applied to the results in units of the Y-Axis. Figure
14, is representative of the production/deterioration tolerance used for a
typical parameter synthesis curve. The tolerance band arrived at by summing
this production/deterioration spread with the curve read inaccuracies are as
fol1ows:
Curve 1 — 0.15 PT4/PT2
Curve IB — 0.15 PT4/PT2
Curve 2 ~ 300 RPM N2A/0TT2
Curve 3 — 0.35 PT6/PT2
Curve 4 - 500 RPM N1/V07T2~
Curve 5 — 150°F FTIT
These tolerance bands are increased by 50% during a power lever transient to
avoid false alarms.
Logic was developed to incorporate the curve set and associated tolerance
bands into a viable detection, isolation and accommodation concept, as shown
in Figure 15 through 18. The failure detection logic, as shown in Figure 15,
determines the general health of the five engine sensors. A comparison of the
absolute value of the difference between the sensor measurements (Xsen(n)) and
the corresponding synthesized value (Xsyn(n)) to the associated tolerance band
is used to create a sensor fault word. This word varies uniquely between 0 to
31 depending on which curve or combination of curves are out of tolerance with
their corresponding sensor measurements.
The sensor fault word is a 5 bit binary word, each bit being associated with
one of the parameter synthesis curves. If a particular curve is out-of-
tolerance, the polarity of the bit corresponding to the out-of-tolerance curve
26
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Figure 13 Final Curve Set for the Parameter Synthesis Algorithm
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Figure 15 Parameter Synthesis Detection Logic
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Figure 18 Parameter Synthesis Isolation Verification
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changes from 0 to 1. The value of the binary bits that are set are then
arithemetically summed to create the fault word. The calculation of the fault
word is shown in Table VI.
If the fault word is zero, all curves are in tolerance with the sensor meas-
urements, and, no failures are detected. A non-zero fault word indicates a
sensor failure which requires exercising the isolation logic to pinpoint the
failure to a particular sensor. The isolation and accommodation logic, as
shown in Figures 16 and 17, compares the fault word (FLSUM) to a set of known
fault words which are uniquely associated with particular sensor failures. The
set of known fault words used to isolate the failure to a particular sensor
measurement is shown in Table VII.
TABLE VI
PARAMETER SYNTHESIS FAULT WORD CALCULATION
Bit Number 1 i 1 1 I
Bit Value 1 2 4 8 16
For Out-of-Toler-
ance Curves
Associated Curve 1 Curve 2 Curve 3 Curve 4 Curve 5
Curve
Bit 5
Where: Fault word = zL Bit values
Bit 1
Note: If the curve is not out-of-tolerance with the sensor measurements; i.e.,
the bit polarities are all 0, the value of the bits are zero. For a no failure
case, the fault word =0.
TABLE VII
PARAMETER SYNTHESIS FAULT WORD ISOLATION SET
Sensor Measurement Value of Known Fault Word
Nl 1
N2 3,7,15,23,31
PT4 10, 8
PT6 4
FTIT 16
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If the fault word generated is identical to one of the known fault words, the
failure has been isolated to a given sensor and the sensed value is tempor-
arily set equal to the synthesized value. A verification of the isolation
validity is conducted for the next 1.0 second. The detailed verification logic
is shown in Figure 18.
Blocks 1 and 2 in Figure 18 implement a counter to record the number of times
a particular sensor has been isolated as a failed measurement during a flight
or mission. This logic will permanently latch a sensor as failed if an inter-
mittent failure occurs more than 100 control computation cycles. (This is
based upon a 0.01 second computation cycle for the nonlinear simulation.)
Blocks 3 and 4 delay further isolation verification for 0.2 second during
which time any transient resulting from the switch over from sensed to synthe-
size would decay significantly. After the 0.2 second delay, if the failure was
isolated properly, the fault word should be zero. A non-zero fault word
indicates that the failure was incorrectly isolated and operation is reverted
to the sensed measurements. If the fault word is zero for the next 0.8
seconds, the sensor failure has been properly isolated and the permanent
failure flag is set for the failed sensor. If the failure fault word is
non-zero during the 0.8 second interval, the failure was either incorrectly
isolated or intermittent in nature. This logic assumes that a second failure
would not occur during the one second time interval.
Once the permanent failure flag has been set, the parameter associated with
the failed sensor is permanently set equal to the synthesized value, as shown
on Figure 18. After the failure is permanently accommodated, the logic is
reconfigured for second failure detection, isolation and accommodation
capability. The reconfiguration process involves increasing tolerance bands
and modifying the known fault words (FLSEN(k)) to account for the loss of the
input signal.
The parameter synthesis logic was programmed in the FIDO MVC simulation and
was exercised over the selected flight operating conditions. Figures 19 and 20
show an example of the parameter synthesis algorithm response to an Nl sensor
failure. The failure was simulated at sea level static, intermediate power and
was induced at a time of 3.0 seconds. These figures show only a minor trans-
ient occurring when switching from sensed measurements to synthesized, with a
minimal loss in steady state accuracy (-55. pounds loss in thrust). The
detailed analysis of the parameter synthesis algorithm performance is included
in Section 5.
4.2 SIMPLIFIED ENGINE MODEL
4.2.1 Introduction
A full envelope simplified nonlinear model of the FIDO engine is required for
two reasons when developing, evaluating, and implementing fault detection,
isolation and accommodation (DIA) concepts. First, all of the techniques
investigated in this program employ filters which require a real time micro-
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processor implemented engine model. A simplified model minimizes hardware
requirements. Second, evaluating the concepts involves many computer runs of
an engine simulation. Using a simplified model (rather than a full nonlinear
dynamic deck) during the initial evaluation process can greatly reduce cost.
A procedure for generating a full envelope, simplified nonlinear engine model
is presented in this section. This model is developed from steady state opera-
ting line data and linear dynamic models generated about that operating line.
The simplified model generation procedure is summarized in Figure 21. Linear
dynamic model generation techniques are described in detail in Reference 1 and
summarized in Appendix C. Model reduction procedures, for reducing the number
of state variables, are described in Reference 4 and summarized in Appendix D.
The form of the resulting model is shown in a block diagram in Figure 22, and
described with the equations,
X = F(X-XSS) (1)
where
*ss = xb - F-lG-(U - Ub)
and
Y = Yb + H-(X - Xb) + D-(U - UD)
Here the state derivative, X, is being driven by the distance the state, X, is
from its steady state value, Xss. The subscript, b, denotes a base point
obtained from the original steady state operating line data.
This model looks much like a linear model. Note, however, that the model
matrices (F, F~'G, H and D) are functions of the operating condition as are
the base points (Xb, Ujj, and Yj, ). In general, the matrices used are
formed by scheduling linear model matrices throughout the flight envelope. The
base points are equivalent to the operating line data.
Section 4.2.2 presents a review of the original sixteenth order linear models,
the simplified linear models, and the generation of the simplified nonlinear
models. Section 4.2.3 discusses model validation.
4.2.2 Simplified Nonlinear Model Development
4.2.2.1 Engine Linear Models
The F100 nonlinear dynamic engine simulation was used to develop the steady
state operating line data and linear engine models. Sixteenth order linear
models were generated by Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Group using a full FIDO
nonlinear simulation during the F100 Multivariable Control Program (Contract
F33615-75-C-2053). A description of the procedure and a complete set of
dynamic models is listed in reference 3.
36
ENGINE MANUFACTURE
OPERATING DATA
DETAILED NONLINEAR
DYNAMIC DECK
STEADY STATE
OPERATING DATA
REFERENCE POINT
SCHEDULES
xss(u>
1
FULL ORDER
LINEAR MODELS
(
MODEL REDUCTION
PROCEDURE
MODEL MATRICES
F, F~1 G, H, D
F(* ill
SIMPLIFIED NONLINEAR MODEL
x = F(XSS,U) x (t) - xgs(u)
Figure 21 Development of A Simplified Nonlinear Model From Reference
Schedules and Reduced Order Linear Models
Figure 22 Simplified Nonlinear Model Implementation
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Table VIII lists the state, input and output variables which constitute these
linear models. Table IX lists the linear model operating points. Figure 23
shows the F-15 aircraft operating envelope spanned by the chosen set of
linearization points.
TABLE VIII
ENGINE VARIABLES USED IN LINEAR MODELS
1. Engine State Variables
X] = Fan Speed, SNFAN
(N]) - rpm
X2 = Compressor Speed, SNCOM
(N2) - rpm
X3 = Compressor Discharge Pressure,
Pt3 - psia
X4 = Interturbine Pressure,
Pt4.5 - Psia
Xs = Augmentor Pressure, Pt7m -
psia
Xg = Fan Inside Diameter Discharge
Temperature T^ 2.5h ~ °R
Xy = Duct Temperature,*Tt2.5c ~ °R
Xs = Compressor Discharge Temperature,
2. Engine Inputs
Ul = Main Burner Fuel Flow, WFMB -
Ib/hr
U2 = Nozzle Jet Area, Aj - ft2
u"3 = Compressor Fan Inlet Variable
Vane, CIVV - deg
u"4 = Rear Compressor Variable Vane,
RCVV - deg
Us = Customer Compressor Bleed Flow,
BLC - %
Xg = Burner Exit Fast Response Temper-
ature, Tt4n1 - °R
X-JQ = Burner Exit Slow Response Temperature,
Tt4 10 -°R
X-ii = Burner Exit Total Temperature,
X-|2 = Fan Turbine Inlet Fast Response
Temperature, Tt4.5n1 - °R
X-)3 = Fan Turbine Inlet Slow Response
Temperature, Tt4.51o - °R
X-|4 = Fan Turbine Exit Temperature,
Tt5 - °R
X-J5 = Duct Exit Temperature, Tt6c- °R
X-jg = Mixed Exhaust Stream
Temperature, Tt7m - °R
3. Engine Outputs
YI = Engine Net Thrust Level, FN - Ib
Y2 = Total Engine Airflow, WFAN -
Ib/sec
¥3 = Turbine Inlet Temperature, Tt4
¥4 = Fan Stall Margin, SMAF
¥5 = Compressor Stall Margin, SMHC
Y6 = Fan Exit A P/P, (Pt2.5 -PS2 5)/pS2 5,based on test data
Y7 = Fan'Exit AP/P, (Pt2 5 -
PS2.b)/Ps2.5 theoretical function
of area and airflow
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TABLE IX
LINEAR MODEL OPERATING POINTS
CODE POINT
NO.
MACH
NO.
ALTITUDE
FT.
(000)
PLA
(DEG)
COMMENTS
Basic
Set
1
2
3
4
5
Group I 1
2
3
4
5
Group II 6
7
8
9
10
Extra(E)
GroupIII 1
2
3
4
5
6
Group IV 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.6
1.2
2.2
0.9
0.9
2.5
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
1.8
1.8
0.3
1.8
2.5
2.15
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
10.0
30.0
0.0
40.0
45.0
65.0
65.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.0
30.0
30.0
45.0
45.0
45.0
75.0
20.0
20.0
40.0
65.0
58.5
20
36
52
67
83
24
83
24
20
24
83
83
130
83
130
36
52
67
83
36
52
67
20
20
83
20
20
83
83
52
40
83
83
83
83
83
83
Sea Level Static Operating Line
Additional Unchoked Model
Performance at Max. TT4
PT4 Lower Limit
Unchoked Model Behavior
Unchoked Model Behavior
Maximum q, PT4, Nl, N2, TT4
TT3, TT4 Limit, Compressor Stab.
Low Augmentor Pressure
Fan Stability
Maximum Augmentation
Additional Operating Line
Data for Engine Test
Minor Deck Modification
With BLD/HPX Extraction
Minor Deck Modification
Additional Operating Line
Data for Engine Test
Rating Point
Altitude Part Power Point
Minimum Burner Pressure
Low Density, Reynolds Index
Maximum Nl, TT3, TT4
Fan Stability
TT4 Limit, Compressor Stab.
Compressor Stability
PT2, TT2 Coverage
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4.2.2.2 Reduced Order Linear Models
Simplified linear models were generated using the 16th order linear models and
reducing the order of the system. A modal decomposition method was utilized
for this purpose. A detailed description of this method is given in Appendix
D. The reduced order models were then scheduled against engine parameters to
obtain a simplified model operable over the entire flight envelope.
The reduction process allows important dynamic modes to be retained and
important, measureable quanitities to be included as state variables in the
system of equations. Four states which represented imporant engine parameter
dynamics, were chosen as a result of dynamic response analysis. Table X lists
the states and input and output variables which constitute the reduced order
models. The two rotor speeds are an important part of engine dynamics at each
flight condition. The other two states are slow response modes and lie within
the bandwidth of interest.
TABLE X
ENGINE VARIABLES USED IN REDUCED ORDER MODELS
1. Engine State Variables
XT = Fan Speed, SNFAN (N-|) - rpm
Xg = Compressor Speed, SNCOM (Ng) - rpm
2. Engine Inputs
U] = Main Burner Fuel
Flow, WFMB - Ib/hr
U2 = Nozzle Jet Area,
AJ - ft2
U3 = Compressor Inlet
Variable Vane,
CIVV-deg
U^ = Rear Compressor Vari-
able Vane, RCVV-deg
Us = Customer Compressor
Bleed Flow, BLC - %
X3 = Burner Exit Slow Response Temperature,
Tt41o - °R
X^ = Fan Turbine Inlet Slow Response Temper
ature, Tt4.51o-°R
3.Engine Outputs
Y! = Fan Speed, SNFAN (Nj) - rpm
Y£ = Compressor Speed, SNCOM (N2) - rpm
¥3 = Burner Pressure, PT4 - psia
¥4 = Augmentor Pressure, PT6 - psia
YS = Fan Turbine Inlet Temperature, FTIT - °R
The simplified model must include burner pressure for use in the maximum and
minimum burner pressure limiting loops in the control mode. However, the bur-
ner pressure flow dynamics have a time constant always less than 0.01 sec.
Therefore, burner pressure is included only as an output variable, i.e., as a
linear combination of the chosen state variables. Similarly, augmentor pres-
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sure is required for calculating engine pressure ratio (EPR), but its associa-
ted time constant is small. Therefore, it is only included as an output vari-
able. The maximum temperatures specified for compressor discharge and turbine
inlet stations in the gas path are implicitly limited in the control mode by
limiting the maximum fan turbine inlet temperature. Thus, Fan Turbine Inlet
Temperature (FTIT) is also included as an output.
4.2.2.3 Simplified Nonlinear Model
The simplified, reduced order linear models discussed above were used to
generate a simplified nonlinear model to operate over the flight envelope.
Elements of the linear model matrices were scheduled using engine variables
and ambient parameters.
The reduced order linear model is given by
SX = F-8X + G-6U (2)
6Y = H-8X + D-6U (3)
where 6X, SU, and 6Y are perturbational quantities given by
6X = X - Xb
6U = U - Ub (4)
6Y = Y - Yb
The quantities Xb, Ub, and Yb are the steady state equilibrium points(base points) about which the small perturbation assumption is valid.
An alternative representation of a linear model can be written as follows. In
steady state X = 0, so that equation (3) becomes
0 = F-6XSS + G-SUSS
8XSS = - F-lG.8Uss
or Xss = Xb - F^G'dJ - Ub) (5>
Using equations (4) and (5), equations (2) and (3) can be written as
X = F-(X - Xss) (6)
Y = Yb + H-(X - Xb) + D-(U - Ub) (7)
Xss is defined as the reference schedule of the states given the control,
when the system is in equilibrium. This formulation is valid if it is assumed
that U(t) is piecewise constant on an interval [NT, (N + 1) T] . The time
interval T can be made small relative to the dynamics so that the constant
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control assumption is valid. Equations (6) and (7) is an accurate model only
if SX and SU are small. In steady state if the control reaches the base
point; i.e. U = UD, then it is guaranteed that the state and outputs will
reach their base points, i.e. X = Xjj and Y = Y&. This is true independent
of F, F-IG, H, and D provided F is stable.
The implementation of this simplified nonlinear model for operation over the
flight envelope involves scheduling system matrices F, F^G, H, and D used
inequations (5) thru (7). These matrices were scheduled as a function of
ambient and engine variables. The ambient variables used were engine inlet
total pressure (PT2) and temperature (TT2). The engine variables were low and
high rotor speeds (Ml, N2), burner and augmentor pressures (PT4, PT6), and
compressor inlet and fan turbine inlet temperatures (TT25, TT45). A regression
analysis was used to produce polynominal functions which fit the model matrix
elements with operating variables. A typical matrix element looked like the
following.
F (i,j) = a! (Nl)3 + a2 (PT4 * PT6) +....+ an (8)
The number of terms in a model depended on the accuracy of the model desired.
Polynominals for the matrix elements were generated using regression analysis
software available in Systems Control Incorporated's software library.
Values for the engine variables used in the polynominal s and the base point
vectors Xjj, Ufc,' and ¥5, were obtained from the steady state reference
point schedules and the reference transition control in the Multivariable
Control logic. The transition control in this logic essentially provides a
"reasonable transient reference" for the linear quadratic regulator control to
"regulate to". The transient low rotor speed reference from this transition
control was used as the basic reference for the simplified model base point
inputs and polynominal parameters. This was accomplished by reading the low
rotor speed versus power lever angle steady state reference schedule "back-
wards" to define a power lever angle, or "virtual power code", corresponding
to the trajectory value for low rotor speed. The "virtual power code" is then
used to read all of the steady state reference schedules to obtain the base
point references, X^, U|,, and YK, and other engine variables required
for the simplified nonlinear model calculations. Figure 24 presents the
overall procedure. The fact that the base points and the system matrices vary
as a function of operating conditions makes the engine model nonlinear.
4.2.3 Model Validation
The simplified engine model is incorporated in the filters employed by the
various detection, isolation and accommodation concepts. The model was there-
fore implemented in the filter for vacation. Filter gains were designed
using simplified linear models at selected points in the envelope. These
points correspond to the points at which regulator gains were designed for the
FIDO multivariable control. These filter gains were also scheduled against the
ambient and engine variables over the flight envelope.
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Figure 24 Scheduling of Base Points and Matrices for the Simplified Nonlinear
Engine Model
The model validation was performed at the 15 selected flight operating points
on the envelope. Figures 25 thru 33 show examples of the performance of the
Kalman filters incorporating the simplified nonlinear model compared with the
engine output.
While performance of the combined filter/model algorithm was quite good at the
lower altitude and mach number flight conditions, some problems of steady
state and transient mismatch were encountered at higher altitudes and mach
numbers. These problems were found to result from not having a sufficient
number of the original linear models available to constrain the curve fitting
procedure for the matrix elements at these flight conditions to obtain a good
accuracy of fit. Even though the Kalman filters did a commendable job of
minimizing these mismatches, the effectivness of the detection, isolation and
accommodation algorithms was reduced at these flight conditions. Additional
work is required to generate more linear models and improve the curve fits for
the simplified nonlinear models.
4.3 FORMULATION OF ADVANCED CONCEPTS
4.3.1 Introduction
A generalized form of a~ closed loop control system including sensor fault
detection, isolation, and accommodation is shown in Figure 34. The system
plant, actuators, and sensors are in the feedforward loop. All computations
are performed in the feedback loop. These computations include evaluations of
the commanded control, estimation of states, and detection, isolation, and
accommodation of failures.
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Figure 30 Actual and Estimated Fan Turbine Inlet Temperature (Flight
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Accommodation Logic
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A spectrum of techniques for detecting, isolating and accommodating sensor
failures have been reported in the literature (Reference 6 is a good summary
article). This section contains a description of five detection, isolation,
and accommodation strategies that were formulated during this program. The
details of these concepts were developed specifically for the aircraft turbine
engine system. Presented first is an overview of the general concepts from
which a specific technique may be derived. This is followed by detailed dis-
cussions of the five concepts developed for this program.
4.3.2 Overview of Existing Techniques
Advanced techniques for detecting, isolating and accommodating sensor failures
make use of classical statistical inference calculation and hypothesis testing
applied to modern estimators and filters, and analytical redundancy available
in unlike sensor channels. Table XI lists several viable techniques. Some of
these techniques are capable of detection, isolation and accommodation, while
others are only capable of one or two parts. Some techniques share a degree of
commonality. Thus, individual techniques or combinations of techniques can be
considered for formulating concepts.
TABLE XI
TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTION, ISOLATION, AND ACCOMMODATION
o Bank of Kalman Filters
o Failure Sensitive Filters
o Observers
o Voting Techniques
o Innovations Testing
o Modified Kalman Filters
o Parameter Estimation
o Jump Processes
This section reviews several detection, isolation, and accommodation tech-
niques. All of these are based on the redundancy of information in unlike
sensor channels (analytical redundancy). Traditional schemes of voting between
redundant sensor hardware channels are only briefly reviewed. The advantage of
analytical redundancy is that it avoids many of the size, weight, and cost
penalties imposed by redundant hardware. The general disadvantage is computa-
tional complexity.
4.3.2.1 Bank of Kalman Filters
This technique employs a group ('bank') of Kalman filters to hypothesize each
failure mode. Normal operation of the system is represented by the null hypo-
thesis H0. The failure hypotheses are labelled as H^. The residuals of
each filter are monitored and likelihood functions (e.g., probability density
functions) are generated. Other statistical tests (7) can also be performed on
the filter innovations. The hypothesis with the maximum likelihood of occur-
rence is then selected as representing the true failure mode. Concepts under-
lying the bank of filter's approach are discussed in references 8 and 9.
Figure 35 demonstrates the concept.
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Figure 35 Bank of Kalman Filters Approach
The advantages of the bank of filters technique are; 1) It provides a good
yardstick for comparison with simpler techniques, and 2) It allows insight
into the failure propagation dynamics after failure detection. The disadvan-
tages are 1) the bank of filters approach results in excessive computational
complexity, and 2) there is the possibility of the bank of filters becoming
oblivious and failures^going undetected.
4.3.2.2 Failure Sensitive Filters
Failure sensitive filters can be classified as 1) filters using failure states
in dynamics, and 2) detection filters. Figure 36 is a general block diagram of
this technique.
4.3.2.2.1 Failure State Augmented Filters
This type of filter augments the state vector with failure states to form a
higher dimensional system in state space. Several techniques which use these
filters and are sensitive to specific types of failures have been developed.
Kerr (10) discusses an approach where a bounded region is defined around the
nominal and estimated trajectories and tests are performed to determine over-
lapping of the two regions. It is a geometrical approach and models failures
as states for detection purposes. Figure 37 demonstrates this concept.
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A simple approach for detection and isolation is to compare the estimated
failure modes against a predetermined threshold. An advantage is that
accommodation can be performed by using the estimate of the failure mode
itself. A disadvantage is the poor estimation due to increased order of the
filter.
4.3.2.2.2 Detection Filters
Detection filters were developed by Beard (11) and Jones (12). The basic idea
is to select the gain matrix such that filter innovations tend to zero in the
no-failure state and give an indication of sensor failure in the failed state.
Beard's (11) choice of gains is directed towards making the innovations point
in a fixed direction in case of a failure. For example, it is easy to show
that if the first sensor fails, the first component of filter residual vector
is large relative to other components. In such cases, faults may be detected
and some faults isolated uniquely.
The major advantage of detection filters is the simplicity with which they can
be used. The disadvantages are 1) susceptibility to instrument errors and
random disturbances, 2) applicable in theory only to linear regimes where the
model structure does not change, 3) modelling errors may appear as soft fail-
ures, 4) criteria for declaring faults are hard to set, and 5) in general,
this method requires measurements of all state variables.
4.3.2.2.3 Non-Oblivious Filters
If the mathematical model of a system is "close to" the actual physical
system, Kalman filtering is the optimal technique for estimation. Performance
may be degraded, however, due to modeling errors and the tendency of Kalman
Filters to become "oblivious" to the sensor outputs. That is, as more and more
information is received, the state estimation error covariance is decreased.
Consequently, the filter gains are reduced and the filter bandwidth is reduced.
If a failure occurs early in the measurement sequence, while the filter gain
and bandwidth are large, the filter can respond properly to the change. How-
ever, as the error covariance and gain decrease, the filter begins to "know
the state too well." Thus, as time goes on, it becomes oblivious to incoming
information and fails to track the actual system behavior. In fault tolerant
systems it is desired to have filters which are sensitive to new data so that
abrupt changes are reflected in the filter behavior.
Two techniques exist for avoiding the oblivious filter,
tially age weighted filtering and the limited memory
techniques ensure that the filter gains on all
zero. Hence, the filters remain sensitive to failures.
They are the exponen-
filtering (13). Both
failure modes never approach
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4.3.2.3 Observers
A traditional scheme for protecting a system against failures in its feedback
sensors is to provide the system with three (or more) sets of sensors, so that
there is redundancy in the feedback information. A voting logic may then be
used to identify a faulty instrument output. This approach works well in
systems where redundant instrument sets do not cause cost, weight, or size
problems.
The technique of using observers requires only one set of instruments. The
redundancy provided by multiple sets of instruments is provided, artificially,
in the control computer by a subsystem of multiple observers (Figure 38). It
is assumed that the single set of instruments consists of three or more indi-
vidual sensors. The output of each sensor is used to drive an observer, which
is designed for that sensor. Thus, each sensor has its own observer. Each
observer estimates the states, so there is redundancy in estimates. These
observer estimates are compared in a voting manner. For perfect sensors and
perfect system dynamics, the estimates will converge to the real state vector
in a very short time.
SENSOR 1 / z^k)
z,(t)
SENSOR 2 / Z2(k) ^
Z2(t)
SENSOR m / zm(k)
*m(t)
BANK OF
OBSERVERS
OBSERVER 1
OBSERVER 2
OBSERVER m
x\ (k)
x2 (k)
m^ (k)
COMPARATOR
AND
FAILURE
DETECTION
LOGIC
FAILED
SENSOR i
ZKk)
Figure 38 Bank of Observers Technique
If a sensor fails, however, the observer estimate, corresponding to that
sensor, is in error and a comparison between the estimated states identifies
the faulty sensor. Reference 14 discusses a scheme using multiple observers.
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4.3.2.4 Voting Techniques
When redundant sensor channel information is available (analytic or hardware
redundancy) voting techniques are useful. These methods work very well for
hard failures and certain types of soft failures.
The standard voting process considers three (or more) "identical" signals. A
marked deviation in one of the three redundant signals is sufficient to
identify a failure. A recent voting scheme is presented in [15] by Broen.
The advantages of this technique are 1) it is simple to use, 2) not much
computation is involved compared to other techniques, 3) it is easy to
implement. The disadvantages include 1) detection of hard failure is possible,
but only for systems with a high level of parallel redundancy; and 2) soft
failures, like bias shifts, are hard to detect.
4.3.2.5 Innovations-Based Failure Detection Schemes
These schemes involve monitoring of the innovations of a filter based on the
hypothesis of no-failure operation of the system. For a system described by a
set of linear differential equations, a Kalman filter is often used to gener-
ate this innovation process (or sequence)*. Several detection schemes are
discussed here.
4.3.2.5.1 Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test
The generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) technique requires existing functional
redundancy to extract fault detection information. This technique monitors the
output of one Kalman Filter (Figure 39). A bank of simple correlation opera-
tions and threshold comparisons is driven by the filter innovations. These
correlations are very complex, however, as found in current literature [16],
[17].
The generalized likelihood ratio technique detects the onset of abrupt changes
in linear systems. It allows simultaneous detection of failure, the time of
occurrence of failure and the extent of the failure. The failure of a sensor
produces a non-white residual
Y(k) = y'(k) + G.(k , 8) v
* Mehra and Peschon (7) have discussed various innovations in testing for
failure detection and isolation.
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Figure 39 Innovations Based Detection and Isolation Scheme
where 7'(k) is the residual for normal operating filter and Gj(k ,9) des-
cribes the effect of failure v of type i occurring at a time e on a residual
at time k. A set of hypotheses are established to distinguish between failure
and no failure modes, as follows:
H0 = no failure mode
Hi = failure mode of type i ( v and 6 unknown)
The Generalized Likelihood Ratio is defined as
L,(k) =
p(Y(l). ....>Y(k))/Hi>9 = 9 (k) V = V (k) (10)
P(Y(D, ...., Y(k)/H0)
where p is the probability density function of the innovations sequence [ T ( i )
i = l,...k], given the hypothesis H-,- and given the maximum likelihood esti-
mates of 6 and v .
When a failure occurs, the decision rule for choosing between a failure and no
failure is
for Hi true: Ln- (K)> XD (11)
for Ho true: Li (K)< XQ
where XD is a predetermined threshold.
The advantages of this technique are: 1) built in functional relationships
allow reduced requirements for multiple redundancy, 2) the technique is com-
putationally feasible, 3) fast failure recovery is obtained since the time of
failure occurrence is explicitly determined. The technique therefore does not
have oblivious features.
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The major disadvantage of this technique is that it is very sensitive to
modelling errors. An accurate model is therefore required for a good estimate
of failure parameters.
4.3.2.5.2 Likelihood Ratio Test
The likelihood ratio (LR) technique is in principle similar to the 6LR tech-
nique except that it does not involve prediction of failure time or the extent
of failure. The likelihood ratio is simply a ratio of two probabilities
(12)
p ( 7(1), . . . , 7(k))/Ho
where the probability density function in the numerator is calculated using
the innovations 7 (j) from a filter designed on the basis of assumed failure
(hypothesis H-j) and the denominator is calculated based on the assumption of
no-failure (hypothesis H0). The likelihood ratio is compared against a
predefined threshold Ap. If L-j(k) is less than A D, a decision is made
in favor of no failure hypothesis H0; and if Li(k) is greater than A D»
Hi is declared to be true, i.e., a failure is detected.
4.3.2.5.3 Sequential Probability Ratio Test
The sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) differs from the likelihood ratio
test (LR) in that SPRT compares the likelihood ratio Li(k) (equation 12)
against two thresholds A L, A
 u. If the ratio exceeds one threshold or
falls below the other, a decision is made corresponding to the threshold that
was crossed (see figure 40). The decision is, however, deferred until a
threshold is crossed.
This technique was not applicable because a valid state estimate is required
at each time step for the control logic. Therefore a decision on whether or
not a failure has occurred has to be made. This reduces the SPRT to a simple
hypothesis test.
4.3.2.5.4 Chi-Squared Test
The chi-squared test is a test on the whiteness of a residual sequence. Speci-
fically, the covariance C of an innovation sequence 7i, is given by (7)
C = 1 2 (7i - 7 )•( 71 - 7 )T (13)
N j=l
where N is the sample size. In case of no failure, C has a WISHART distribu-
tion. The^trace of C has.,a chi-squared .( x 2) distribution (24).. with JN-1)degrees of freedom. A failure decision is made wnen the probability of the
innovation sequences being non-white exceeds a specified threshold.
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Figure 40 Sequential Probability Ratio Test
4.3.2.5.5 Modified Least Squares Criterion
This technique was devised to suppress extremely large residuals, obtained
from bad sensor data, by modifying the least squares criterion. A very small
weighting is given to large residuals. This method essentially involves
performing a static test at each point in time, incorporating the new meas-
urement and the predicted estimate of this measurement based on previous data.
This criterion is also referred to as Weighted Sum Square Residual (USSR) test
[8].
4.3.2.5.6 Modified Kalman Filter Design
This procedure uses the functional redundancy in the system together with a
modified Kalman filter as a means of fault detection. Several methods have
been developed which modify the design of the kalman filter to achieve
specific requirements. For example, a nonlinear single-stage filter algorithm
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with filter gains calculated using a linearized system model is discussed in
reference 25. This approach reduces the computational burden of a bank of
Kalman filters running in parallel. A second example is the application of
nonlinear filtering to failure detection in linear systems. This is discussed
in reference 26. This approach derives linear optimal estimator equations
using nonlinear filtering equations. Several other techniques are discussed in
references 27 and 28. These techniques control the estimate error divergence
in the case of a failure.
4.3.2.5.7 Parameter Estimation Technique
The failure modes (such as scale factor, failure parameters, and bias) are
estimated from input and output data. These estimated values are compared with
known values, and substantial differences between the two indicates a failure.
Parameter estimation techniques are discussed in reference 18.
A simplified block diagram of the above concept is shown in Figure 41.
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Figure 41 Parameter Estimation Technique
4.3.2.5.8 Jump Process Technique
This technique considers failures as jump processes with known probability
distribution (19). It allows the formulation of failure sensitive control laws
and computation of conditional probabilities of failure.
Another technique (20) based on nonlinear filtering theory
Kalman filter for both tracking the state and detecting a
ever, limited to specific types of failures.
reparameterizes the
fault. It is, how-
This approach is still in early stages of theoretical development. The general
concept is to represent randomly occurring failures as jump processes and to
estimate time of occurrence and magnitude of jumps using optimal filtering
theory. Solutions turn out to be infinite dimension filters. Research is being
carried out to circumvent this problem without losing too much performance.
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4.3.2.9 Accommodation of Failures
Two failure accommodation techniques were utilized for development of advanced
detection, isolation, and accommodation concepts.
4.3.2.9.1 Accommodation Using Failure Parameter Estimate
Some of the detection and isolation techniques discussed above include the
failure parameter (bias, drift) in the state vector for estimation purposes.
Other techniques like maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can also be used to
estimate failure magnitude. The available failure parameter estimate can be
subtracted from the measurement to produce an "unfailed" sensor reading. This
technique requires a good estimate of the failure parameter. Once the failure
is detected, accommodation could be delayed as much as the time involved in
parameter estimation process.
4.3.2.9.2 Reconfiguration and Reinitialization of the Kalman Filter
If the Kalman Filter is being driven by faulty measurements, the state esti-
mates wander off from their nominal values. Once a failure has been detected
and isolated, the filter can be reconfigured so that the faulty measurement
does not drive it. The reconfiguration involves using a new filter gain matrix
designed with the assumption of one faulty measurement. This technique
therefore requires as many gain matrices as there are failure modes.
Once the filter is reconfigured, it should be reinitialized since the state
estimates are off-nominal. Estimates from a robust filter are needed for
reinitialization. If, however, robust estimates are not available, reconfigur-
ation is adequate and will bring the filter back to its nominal path. A small
transient will result if the filter is only reconfigured since the filter
starts out at some off-nominal point as its initial condition. Reinitializa-
tion will eliminate the transient.
4.3.3 Formulation of Advanced Sensor Failure Detection, Isolation and Accom-
modation Concepts
Five viable advanced concepts were developed based upon the techniques dis-
cussed in the last section. The available techniques were classified according
to their functional features. Most techniques provide at least the detection
capability with isolation and accommodation either implicitly (e.g., in a
triplex voting scheme) or explicitly (e.g., in a bank of Kalman filters)
addressed. A classification of the techniques based on the information
processing structure, parameter on which tests are performed and decision
techniques and logic used is presented in Table XII.
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TABLE XII
CLASSIFICATION OF DETECTION, ISOLATION AND ACCOMMODATION TECHNIQUES
o Logic Structure
- On-line detection and isolation: detection and isolation are performed
at each time step simultaneously
- Off-line isolation: detection is always on-line but isolation is per-
formed off-line, i.e., only after a failure is detected is isolation
performed.
o Parameters
- Innovations based failure check
- Failure state parameter
- Statistical probability check
o Decision Logic
- Generalized Likelihood Ratio Testing (GLR)
- Likelihood Ratio Testing (LR)
- Sequential Probability Ratio Testing (SPRT)
- Weighted Sum Square Residual (USSR)
- Voting
o Decision Technique
- Bank of Observers
- Bank of Filters
- Failure sensitive Filters
o Accommodation Technique
- Subtract estimated failure mode parameter (bias, drift) from the sensor
measurement
- Reconfigure (modify Kalman filter gains) and reinitialize (initialize
to the filter corresponding to the isolated failure mode) the normal
mode (no failure) filter.
The goal in selecting five candidate concepts was to span as many applicable
techniques as possible. Thus, selected features of the above techniques have
been blended together to formulate the five candidate concepts for evaluation.
These concepts are:
1: Detection - Hypothesis testing using LR test
Isolation - Off-line isolation using bank of Kalman filters
based on GLR technique
Accommodation - By "calculation" i.e., failure states are subtracted
from the measurements.
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2: Detection
Isolation
Accommodation -
3: Detection
Isolation
Accommodation
4: Detection
& Isolation
Accommodation -
5: Detection
& Isolation
Accommodation -
Innovations testing based on USSR technique for soft
failure
Innovations testing against thresholds for hard
failure
On-line isolation of hard failures using innovations
testing; off-line isolation of soft failure using
GLR technique. Both structures employ bank of Kalman
filters.
Reconfiguration and reinitialization of normal mode
filter.
Hypothesis testing using LR technique
Off-line logic using failure-sensitive filter
By "calculation" i.e., failure states are subtracted
from the measurements.
Simultaneous detection and isolation using failure
sensitive filter (on-line)
By "calculation" i.e., failure states are subtracted
from the measurements.
Simultaneous detection and isolation using bank of
observers and voting technique
Computation of median of estimates from observers
corresponding to unfailed measurements.
Figures 42 through 46 are block diagrams of the five concepts. Techniques and
logic employed by each concept are found in Table XIII.
TABLE XIII
SELECTED FAILURE DETECTION, ISOLATION
AND ACCOMODATION (FDIA) CONCEPTS
Concept
1
2
3
4
5
DETECTION
LOGIC
STRUCTURE
H0
X
HQ ID,
X
X
PARAMETER
Prob
X
X
Innov
X
DECISION
LOGIC
LR
X
X
WSSR
X
ISOLATION
LOGIC
STRUCTURE
ON-LINE
X
X
X
PARALLEL
X
X
X
PARAMETER
FAILURE
STATE
X
X
X
PROB
X
X
RESIDUAL
X
DECISION
LOGIC
GLR
X
LR
X
THRES-
HOLD
X
X
VOTING
1
X
TECHNIQUE
BANK
OF KF
X
X
BANK
OF DBS
X
FAILURE
SENSITIVE
X
X
ACCOMMO-
DATION
R
X
X
X
R 4 I
X
X
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Figure 42 Detection, Isolation, and Accommodation Concept 1
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Figure 43 Detection, Isolation, and Accommodation Concept 2
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H0 (NO FAILURE) AND
HD (FAILURE ASSUMED)
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Figure 44 Detection, Isolation, and Accommodation Concept 3
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USING FAILURE SENSITIVE
FILTER
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Figure 45 Detection, Isolation, and Accommodation Concept 4
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ACCOMMODATION PERFORMED BV COMPUTING
MEDIAN FROM ESTIMATORS WITH UNFAILED
INPUTS
(MEASUREMENT) (ESTIMATE)
Figure 46 Detection, Isolation, and Accommodation Concept 5
4.3.3.1 Discussion of Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Concepts
The five concepts developed for preliminary evaluation are discussed in this
section. A general formulation of the failure detection, isolation and accom-
modation problem is presented below and will be used to explain detection,
isolation and accommodation concepts.
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A linear dynamic system can be modelled as follows:
Plant Dynamics: X(t) = F(t)-X(t) + G(t) -U(t) + W( t ) (14)
Sensors: Z( t ) = H( t ) -X( t ) + D( t ) -U( t ) + V( t ) (15)
Actuators: U(t) = g-(u c ( t ) ) (16)
equations (14) through (16) can also be written in discrete form for linear
stochastic systems as:
Plant Dynamics: X(k+l) = 0 ( k ) - X ( k ) + r (k) -U(k) + W ( k ) (17)
Sensors: Z (k ) = H ( k ) - X ( k ) + D ( k ) - U ( k ) + V ( k ) (18)
Actuators: U(k) = g'-(Uc ( k ) ) (19)
where W(k ) and V(k ) are zero-mean, independent, white Gaussian sequences with
covariances given by:
E [ W ( J ) - W T (k)] = Q-6jk (20)
E [ V ( j ) - Y T (k) ] = R.5jk (21)
and where 6j|< is the Kronecker delta. Equations (17) through (21) describe a
"no failure model of the system. The optimal state estimator for this model
is a discrete Kalman filter:
X(k + 1/k) = <A(k)-X(k/k) + r(k)-U(k) (22)
X(k/k-l) = X(k/k-l) + K(k)-Y(k) (23)
7(k) = Z(k) - H(k)-X(k/k-l) - D(k)-U(k) (24)
Here 7(k) is the zero-mean, Gaussian innovations process. The estimator gain
matrix, K, is found from:
P(k+l/k) = 0(k) -P(k /k) -0T (k ) + B(k)-QBT (k) (25)
P(k/k)= P(k/k-l)-P(k/k-l) HT (k) - [H(k)-P(k/k- l ) -HT (k)+R]-1H(k)-P(k/k- l ) (26)
K(k) = P(k/k-l)-HT(k). [V(k)]-1 (27)
V(k) = H(k) -P(k/k- l ) -HT (k) + R (28)
where P(k) is the estimation error covariance of the estimate, X(k ) .
The above general formulation is the basis of the concepts described in the
following section.
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4.3.3.1.1 Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Concept 1
Detection: This concept employs hypothesis testing based on the likelihood
ratio (LR) technique. For example, normal mode or no failure operation is
termed null hypothesis, Ho. The failure modes are also hypothesized and are
termed as failure hypothesis, HI .
In a given system, each observation (measurement) has a hypothesis associated
with it. The hypothesis cannot be observed directly. A probability transition
mechanism separates the hypothesis from observations. Hypotheses are accepted
on the basis of knowledge of a priori probabilities, some inherent conditional
probabilities and access to observation space. Thus a failure is detected by
choosing a hypothesis according to some decision logic. In the detection
scheme used here the decision logic is the likelihood ratio test.
Let z be the observation at a decision time and z-t be the predefined
threshold. A decision is then made by testing the hypothesis as follows,
z < zt HO i s true
z >zt HI is true (29)
In the binary decision of Ho and HI, a possibility of errors exists which
are termed as "false alarm" and "miss". A false alarm is the condition when
HI is false but is accepted to be true. Acceptance of Ho when it is false is
called a miss. Let the probability density associated with the measurements
under the hypotheses Ho and HI be P(z/Ho) and P(z/H] ) respectively. The
object of the detection logic is to accept one of the two density functions.
Figure 47 illustrates the hypothesis testing technique. A variety of threshold
selection procedures exists which are given in Table XIV. Each of the mini-
mization procedures results in the comparison of the ratio of two probability
density functions to a given parameter. The resultant likelihood ratio test is
then given by:
P(z/Hi) <X imP11es H0 true
P(Z/HQ) >X implies HI true (30)
In Concept 1, Kalman filter innovations were obtained to formulate the H0
hypothesis (assuming perfect modelling and random noise). Innovations from a
"failure insensitive filter" were obtained to formulate hypothesis H].
Probability density functions using innovations were calculated and the
likelihood ratio test performed for failure detection.
66
Figure 47 Hypothesis Testing Technique
TABLE XIV
THRESHOLD SELECTION
Minimize Miss Probability for a Fixed False- Alarm Rate
Minimize Sum of Miss and False-Alarm Probabilities
Minimize the Bayes Risk
B = COO-P(HO,HO) +
where:
.Hj) = PH
+ C IO-P(H I , HO)
H-J hypothesis associated with failure mode i
C-jj cost of accepting H-J when Hj is true
PU. a-priori probability that Hj is true
P(Hj/Hj) probability of accepting H^ given Hj is true
Isolation: Multiple hypothesis testing using the Generalized Likelihood Ratio
test (6LR) was used for isolation of failures. This technique differs from the
Likelihood Ratio (LR) technique in that the probability density functions
associated with the hypotheses involved an estimated parameter. Maximum like-
lihood techniques was used to estimate the parameter and calculate the condi-
tional densities. A bank of Kalman filters is used in parallel to produce in-
novations. Each filter is based on an assumed failure mode (hypothesis). The
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maximum likelihood estimate of the failure parameter and the filter innova-
tions are used to calculate the generalized likelihood ratio and test the
hypothesis:
max P
 A
0](z/H], 0 - j ) <ximplies HQ true
max P
0()(z/Hl,0o) >Ximplies H-| true (31)
Accommodation: The filter which provides estimates to the control logic is
the normal mode filter (Ho filter) and works directly with sensor measure-
ments. In the event of a failure, the filter drifts while the failure is being
isolated. After isolation the filter needs to be reinitialized. Isolation of a
failure means acceptance of a hypothesis. The filter in the isolation scheme
corresponds to the accepted hypothesis, and is used to reinitialize the normal
mode filter. The filter must be reconfigured to avoid using the failed chan-
nel. This is done by subtracting the failure estimate (maximum likelihood
estimate) from the failed channel. The resulting reinitialized and recon-
figured filter is the accommodation filter.
A detailed flow chart of this concept is shown in Figure 48.
4.3.3.1.2 Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Concept 2
Detection: The sensor failures can be classified as soft or hard failures.
The detection scheme uses a simple threshold comparison check on the normal
mode filter residuals to declare a hard failure. The Weighted Sum Square
Residual (WSSR) test is used for soft failure detection. This technique,
discussed in reference 8, uses filter innovations, for decision making. The
innovation sequence 7(k) is white with known covariance if the model is
perfect and there is no failure. In case of a failure the residual becomes
7(k) = white noise + effect of failure
and the detector is used to identify the failure using a priori knowledge of
white noise covariance and the new statistics. To detect a failure, one
therefore has to compute the quantity, (k) over the last N observations,
W) = ^ _ T T m - V U i - T U ) (32)
j = k - N + 1
where V( j ) is given by (28).
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Figure 48 Flow Chart of DIA Concept 1
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The quantity l(k) is called the Weighted Sum Square Residual. For normal (no-
failure) operation, l(k) is expected to remain small. However, in case of a
failure, l(k) will increase. If X is the threshold value to make a decision
between HQ and HI, we have
<Ximplies Hn true
Kk) '
>Ximplies HI true (33)
The size of N and X are design parameters, chosen to provide acceptable
tradeoff between false alarms and misses.
Isolation: In concept 2, isolation of soft failures is performed "off-line"
using a likelihood ratio test. This procedure was discussed in the detection
scheme of concept one. For isolation purposes, however, since M failure modes
are hypothesized, M Kalman filters (bank of filters) are designed based on
each failure mode. Each of the filters ignores one measurement and operates on
the assumption that the channel containing the failure information has been
ignored. When a failure occurs, the filter which ignores the failed channel
stands out from all other filters and the likelihood ratio test is used to
identify the failed channel filter.
The design parameters involved in this isolation process are the thresholds
used to perform the likelihood ratio test. The techniques in Table XIV can be
used for this purpose.
Accommodation; The normal mode filter serves as the accommodation filter for
the no-failure case. In case of a hard failure, where the failure is detected
and isolated simultaneously, the accommodation filter is reconfigured to
eliminate the failed channel. One of the isolation filters which ignores the
failed channel is used for this purpose. There may be small transients
associated with switching filters. In case of soft. failures, the normal mode
filter provides estimates to the control logic while the failure is being
isolated. After the isolation of the failure the accommodation filter; i.e.,
the normal mode filter, is reinitialized and reconfigured using the "isolated"
filter.
Once a failure has been detected and isolated, further tests for additional
failures are performed on the accommodation filter. Each time a failure is
isolated, the accommodation filter is reinitialized and reconfigured.
A detailed flow chart of this concept is shown in Figure 49.
4.3.3.1.3 Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Concept 3
Detection: The likelihood ratio based detector, used in concept 1 is used for
detection purposes.
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Isolation; A failure sensitive filter is used for off-line isolation of
failures. This filter models the failure parameters (biases, drifts, scale
factor changes) as states and estimates these parameters. The failure magni-
tudes are compared to a threshold to isolate the failure. Note that the
failure state is being used as a test parameter instead of filter innovations
in previously discussed concepts.
Accommodation: The estimated failure state, using the failure sensitive
filter in the isolation scheme, is subtracted from the isolated channel and
used as the input to the normal mode filter. Since the estimate is updated at
each time step, the normal mode filter receives the most current failure
estimate. Thus the normal mode filter is always working with correct informa-
tion (assuming perfect model and estimate). The accommodation filter (normal
mode filter) requires no reinitialization or reconfiguration. However, a
transient may be associated with subtracting the failure state because the
filter may have drifted off while the failure was being isolated.
Figure 50 is a detailed flow chart of concept 3, where bias is shown as the
assumed failure mode in the isolation scheme.
4.3.3.1.4 Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Concept 4
Detection, Isolation and Accommodation: Several well known techniques exist
to design failure-sensitive filters [6, 8, 9, 16, 17]. The filter used in this
concept is the same as the failure-sensitive isolation filter of concept 3.
This single filter provides the three functions of detection, isolation and
accommodation. Detection and Isolation are performed on-line simultaneously by
comparing the estimated failure state against a threshold. Accommodation is
performed by subtracting the failure state from the channel determined to be
failed.
Figure 51 is a detailed flow chart of this concept. Bias is used as the
assumed failure state to demonstrate the function of the DIA concept.
4.3.3.1.5 Detection, Isolation and Accommodation Concept 5
Detection and Isolation; A traditional scheme for failure protection of sys-
tem is to provide redundant sensors and use voting logic to detect a failure.
In the detection and isolation technique employed here, redundancy is provided
by a bank of Luenberger observers [23]. The output from each sensor serves as
input to an observer which estimates the state vector. The state estimates
from each observer are voted on to detect and identify a faulty sensor.
The essence of this DIA concept was derived from Reference [14]. A detailed
flow chart is given in Figure 52. A problem arises if small errors are present
in the design coefficients of different observers or if small noise exists in
the sensors. This is corrected by setting a threshold for each sensor and
declaring a failure if the failure magnitude exceeds that threshold.
Accommodation; The accommodation scheme calculates a median of the estimates
from the unfailed channels to feed them to the control logic.
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4.4 RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY SCREENING PROCESS
4.4.1 Introduction
Advanced detection, isolation and accommodation techniques were reviewed and
five viable concepts were formulated as discussed in the previous section.
These concepts were implemented on the simplified simulation of the FIDO
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engine and multivariable control. Using the scoring system discussed previous-
ly, a screening process evaluated performance of each concept for single PT6,
PT4, Nl, N2, and FTIT sensor failures at the sea level static operating
condition. Each concept was awarded points in terms of its Detection perfor-
mance and criteria. Results of this screening process are presented in this
section. A schematic of the overall procedure is shown on Figure 53.
Two Concepts were selected for further evaluation as a result of this screen-
ing process. This evaluation also utilized the simplified model operational
over the sea-level static operating line. Evaluation was performed for
multiple sensor failures, noise, modelling errors and logic complexity.
Results of the evaluation are also presented in this section.
Based on the detection, isolation and accommodation performance of each
concept, one concept was chosen for implementation, validation and evaluation
on the detailed nonlinear F100 engine and multivan able control simulation.
4.4.2 Sensor Model
A sensor model was developed for implementation on the engine simulation. This
model simulates a wide variety of sensor failures.
The failed sensor model used was
YSN = KSF * Y + KBI + A * v (34)
where
YSN is the sensor output
K<jp is the scale factor
Y is the measured variable
KBI is the bias
A is the noise amplification factor
V is the noise with normal distribution N (0,1); zero mean and unit
variance
Hard failures, soft failures, biases and drifts can be simulated with this
model.
4.4.3 Evaluation of Five Concepts
A comprehensive evaluation of the five detection, isolation and accommodation
concepts was performed to determine the relative merits of each concept. The
evaluation scored each concept for detection performance, engine protection
limit exceedances, and steady state and transient performance using the
scoring system described in Appendix B.
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Figure 53 DIA Concept Evaluation and Selection Procedure
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The flight point altitude = 0 ft, Mach No. = 0, and PLA = 83 degrees (Sea
Level Static - Intermediate power) was chosen for this preliminary evaluation.
A sixteenth order linear model was available and was reduced to fourth order
linear model using the techniques discussed in Section 4.2. This simplified
model was used both as the engine dynamic model and for filter update
equations required by the DIA concepts.
Each concept was implemented as an independent software module which provided
interchangeability and ease in modification. Each concept was evaluated and
ranked based on its single failure capability. Table XV presents the results
of the steady state performance of each concept when a soft failure (bias) of
+50 RPM in fan speed measurement (Nl) was introduced. The last column in Table
XV lists the total score; the higher the total score, the worse the perform-
ance. The total score was calculated by summing the individual scores from the
engine protection, steady state thrust variations, and time to detect portions
of the scoring system. Note that for a case in which a concept was unable to
isolate the failure properly, a maximum score of 15 was assigned to that
concept. This steady state evaluation was of somewhat limited usefullness due
to the fact that the simplified engine model was used both in the filters and
as the engine simulation; i.e., perfect modelling. Several scores of zero were
due to this perfect modelling. This was most evident in the engine protection
portion of the score.
TABLE XV
SCORING RESULTS (SOFT Nl FAILURE)
FLIGHT CONDITION: ALT = 0, Mn = 0 PLA = 83 (STEADY STATE)
FAILURE TYPE: Nl BIAS (+50 RPM)
CON-
CEPT
1
2
3
4
5
TIME
INDUCED
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
TIME
DETECTED
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.516
0.02
TIME
ISOLATED
**
0.016
0.514
0.516
0.02
SCORING
ENGINE PROTECTION
FTIT N2 Nl PT4 SMF SMC SSFn*
.006
0.0
0.1
0.01
.0001
TIME
DETECT
4.0
***6
10.0
10.0
0.0
TOTAL
SCORE
15
***e
10.1
10.0
irkie
€
*Steady State Thrust
**Since failure was not isolated, the maximum score of 15 was assigned to that
concept
*** erepresents a very small non zero value
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A hard failure (bias) of +300 RPM in fan speed measurement was induced and the
steady state and transient performance of each concept was scored. A Power
Lever Angle (PLA) step change from 35 degrees to 83 degrees was input at t=0
seconds and the failure induced at t=0.002 seconds to obtain the transient
plots of Figures 54 through 58. The results of the scoring system are pre-
sented in Table XVI and XVII for steady state and transient performances,
respectively.
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ESTIMATED OUTPUT
1 I750
4.50 ' 5.00
Figure 54 Concept 1; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard Nl failure (+300 RPM) at t = 0.002 Seconds.
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Figure 55 Concept 2; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard Nl failure (+300 RPM) at t = 0.002 Seconds.
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Figure 56 Concept 3; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard Nl failure (+300 RPM) at t = 0.002 Seconds.
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Figure 57 Concept 4; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard Nl failure (+300 RPM) at t = 0.002 Seconds.
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Figure 58 Concept 5; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard Nl failure (+300 RPM) at t = 0.002 Seconds.
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Figure 59 Concept 1; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard PT4 failure (+10 PSIA) at t = 0.002
Seconds.
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Figure 60 Concept 2; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard PT4 failure (+10 PSIA) at t = 0.002
Seconds.
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Figure 61 Concept 3; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard PT4 failure (+10 PSIA) at t = 0.002
Seconds.
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Figure 62 Concept 4; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard PT4 failure (+10 PSIA) at t = 0.002
Seconds.
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Figure 63 Concept 5; Nl Time History Resulting from a 35 to 83 PLA snap at
t=0. Seconds With a Hard PT4 failure (+10 PSIA) at t = 0.002
Seconds.
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TABLE XVI
SCORING RESULTS (HARD Nl FAILURE)
FLIGHT CONDITION: ALT = 0, Mn = 0 PLA = 83 (STEADY STATE)
FAILURE TYPE: Nl BIAS (+300 RPM)
CON-
CEPT
1
2
3
4
5
TIME
INDUCED
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
TIME
DETECTED
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.108
0.01
TIME
ISOLATED
0.162
0.002
0.07
0.108
0.01
SCORING
ENGINE PROTECTION
FTlT N2 Nl PT4 SMF SMC SSFn
0.03
0.0
0.02
0.05
0.0002
TIME
DETECT
1.5
0.0
***
e
0.02
0.0
TOTAL
SCORE
1.53
0.0
0.02
0.07
***
e
TABLE XVII
SCORING RESULTS (HARD Nl FAILURE)
FLIGHT CONDITION: ALT = 0, Mn = 0 PLA = 35 TO 83 DEGREES (TRANSIENT)
FAILURE TYPE: Nl BIAS (+300 RPM)
CON-
CEPT
1
2
3
4
5
TIME
INDUCED
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
TIME
DETECTED
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.072
0.008
TIME
ISOLATED
0.162
0.002
0.07
0.072
0.008
SCORING
ENGINE PROTECTION
FTIT N2
.03
.05
.06
Nl PT4 SMF
***e
***e
SMC
.005
.01
TRAN-
SIENT
.4
.0003
0.01
.08
0
TIME
DETECT
4.
0
0
0
0
TOTAL
SCORE
4.43
0 +
0.06
.15
0
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A hard failure bias of +10 PSIA in burner pressure measurement (PT4) was
introduced at t = 0.002 seconds and detection, isolation and accommodation
performance evaluated for a PLA transient from 35 degrees to 83 degrees t=0.0
seconds. Figures 59 through 63 are time history plots of fan speed and Table
XVIII presents the scoring results.
TABLE XVIII
SCORING RESULTS (HARD PT4 FAILURE)
FLIGHT CONDITION: ALT = 0, Mn = 0 PLA = 35 TO 83 DEGREES (TRANSIENT)
FAILURE TYPE: PT4 BIAS (+10 PSIA)
CON-
CEPT
1
2
3
4
5
TIME
INDUCED
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
TIME
DETECTED
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.07
0.012
TIME
ISOLATED
**
0.002
0.008
0.07
0.012
SCORING
ENGINE PROTECTION
FTIT N2
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.6
***e
Nl Pb
7T7VX
€
SMF
***e
***e
SMC
***
€
***
€
0.1
TRAN-
SIENT
0.5
0.002
0.01
0.8
TIME
DETECT
4.0
0.0
0.0+
0.0
TOTAL
SCORE
15.0
0.02
0.02
1.5
0.0+
Based on the scoring results the following order was established for
performance of each concept:
o FIRST - CONCEPTS 2 and 5
o THIRD - CONCEPT 3
o FOURTH - CONCEPT 4
o FIFTH - CONCEPT 1
Thus concept 2 and 5 were chosen for further study. Details are presented in
the following section.
4.4.4 Further Evaluation of Two Concepts
The operating region for evaluating the two selected concepts was extended for
operation over the sea level static (altitude = 0 ft., Mach. No. = 0) opera-
ting line. The sixteenth order linear models were available for power points,
PLA = 20, 36, 52, 67 and 83 degrees. These models were reduced to fourth order
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models and parameterized over the sea level operating line to develop a
simplified, reduced-order, nonlinear model. The same model was used for engine
dynamics as well as filter update equations. Evaluation of concepts 2 and 5
was performed based on their single and multiple failure performance, effect
of noise, and logic complexity. The relative advantages and disadvantages of
each concept are summarized in Tables XIX and XX.
TABLE XIX
CONCEPT #2 SUMMARY
ADVANTAGES DECISION FILTERS BASED ON MAXIMUM INFORMATION
DECISIONS BASED ON STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF OUTPUT
DISADVANTAGES STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT TESTS MORE DIFFICULT TO
IMPLEMENT THAN SIMPLE THRESHOLD COMPARISON
- DEPENDENT ON NOISE ASSUMPTIONS
- DEPENDENT ON MODEL ACCURACY
TABLE XX
CONCEPT #5 SUMMARY
ADVANTAGES DECISION TESTING IS SIMPLE
DECISIONS BASED ON HIGHLY FILTERED SIGNALS
LOGIC IS SIMPLE
DISADVANTAGES DECISION FILTERS BASED ON MINIMUM INFORMATION
A soft Nl failure (bias) of +50 RPM and soft PT4 failure (bias) of + 3 PSIA
were introduced at t = 0.1 and 0.2 seconds, respectively. A separate random
noise signal was generated and superimposed on all five measurements with the
same magnitude of noise amplification factor, A=l (see equation 34). A step
input from PLA = 30 to 83 degrees was commanded at t = 0.002 seconds. The
transient response of Nl and PT4 are given in Figures 64 and 65 for concept 2
and in Figures 66 and 67 for concept 5. The solid line is the engine simula-
tion output, the large broken line is the output of accommodation filter and
the small broken line is the unfailed sensor measurement (including sensor
lag). The failure detect and isolate events are registered along with the
channel and the time on each plot.
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Figure 64 Concept 2; Nl Transient Response With Nl and PT4 Sensor Failures
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Figure 65 Concept 2; Nl Transient Response With Nl and PT4 Sensor Failures
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Figures 68 through 73 are timing diagrams associated with other combinations
of sensor failures. They register detect and isolate events and times. Concept
5 detected and isolated all failures correctly. However, it also falsely de-
tected, and isolated fan turbine inlet temperature sensor failures when fail-
ures of other sensors were induced. This was attributed to the poor perform-
ance of the observer designed with FTIT as its only input. Since the time
constant associated with fan turbine inlet temperature channel is slow, the
estimates do not follow the measurement very well, causing the false failure
detection. Concept 2 does very well in correctly detecting and isolating
failures but also declared false alarms. This, in most cases, happened after
two failures were detected and isolated and can be attributed to the perform-
ance of the accommodation filter after two failure accommodations. In figures
64, 65, 70 and 72 the false alarm was generated at the next time step after
the isolation of a failure. In the detection technique, the weighted sum
squared residual is averaged over last five measurements and then compared
against the threshold for failure detection. After isolation of the failure
the memory (past five measurements) should be erased (zeroed out) for a fresh
start. It was not done so in the Concept 2 implementation. Therefore the
residual remains high and allows generation of a false alarm right after fail-
ure isolation. This was observed every time a soft failure was isolated
because WSSR technique is only used for soft failure detection. A summary of
the detection, isolation and accommodation performance of the two concepts in
given in Table XXI.
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Figure 68 Concept 2 Detection and Isolation Timing Diagram, Nl and N2 Sensor
Failures
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TABLE XXI
SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF TWO CONCEPTS
CONCEPT 2 PERFORMANCE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON THRESHOLD PARAMETERS
NO MISSED FAILURES FOR ERRORS 2 a*
CONCEPT 5 ABLE TO ISOLATE FAILURES WITH ERRORS = 1 a *
LOGIC SIMPLE TO IMPLEMENT
SLOW FTIT OBSERVER
The two concepts look very promising. The logic complexity of concept 5 is
relatively simpler than concept 2. Concept 2 treats hard and soft failures
separately. Hard failure detection, isolation and accommodation logic of con-
cept 2 involves less computation than concept 5. Soft failure logic of concept
2 is more complex than concept 5. Overall comparison reveals that the hard
failure DIA performance of both concepts was very good. The soft failure DIA
performance of Concept 2 was superior to concept 5. In the light of the above
and Tables XIX to XXI, concept 2 was chosen as the final candidate concept for
evaluation on the detailed nonlinear simulation of the F100 engine.
4.4.5 Final Concept Evaluation
The final concept selected was incorporated into the detailed nonlinear F100
engine and multivan*able control simulation for detailed evaluation. A simpli-
fied nonlinear model was developed by reducing the available sixteenth order
linear models to the fourth order linear models. The fourth order models span
the entire flight envelope and were parameterized for operation over the
flight envelope. This simplified nonlinear model was used to update filter
equations of Concept 2. Note here that since the engine dynamic model and fil-
ter model were different, modelling errors were taken into account by increas-
ing the detection and isolation thresholds.
* o = Standard Deviation
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5.0 COMPARISON OF PARAMETER SYNTHESIS AND ADVANCED ALGORITHMS FOR SENSOR
FAILURE DETECTION, ISOLATION AND ACCOMODATION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
A detailed evaluation of the parameter synthesis based detection, isolation,
and accommodation algorithm and advanced algorithm was conducted by simulating
sensor failures for both steady state and transient operation at the 15 flight
operating points, using the nonlinear F100 engine and Multivariable Control
(MVC) simulation. The evaluation results of the two algorithms were compared
to determine the benefits of implementing advanced algorithms in production
control systems, rather than the conventional parameter synthesis techniques
currently used. The following paragraphs present the results of the comparison.
5.1.1 Steady State Comparison
Steady State failure effects were evaluated for the two algorithms at the
fifteen flight operating conditions selected for this program. The failures
were induced by applying a constant bias to the sensor to be failed. The
magnitude of the biases applied to the sensor values were:
Nl 2000 RPM
N2 2000 RPM
PT6 35 psi
PT4 50 psi
Since the purpose of this test was to observe the accommodation accuracy of
the algorithms, the biases were set arbitrarily large to insure failure detec-
tion. When the failure was induced, the resulting failure transients were
observed and, after the transient effects decayed, pertinent steady state
results were recorded. Tabulations of the resulting Steady State data for the
PT6, PT4, Nl, and N2 sensors failures are shown in Tables XXII through XXVI.
These tabulations show the errors in PT4, N2, N2, fan turbine inlet tempera-
ture, thrust, and surge margins caused by using analytically generated inputs
after any failure accommodation has taken place. The errors on the input
signals (estimation errors) are calculated by taking the difference between
the actual parameter value and the value being sent to the control laws.
Variation in thrust is calculated as a function of the thrust that the engine
is generating after the failure accommodation relative to the normal steady
state thrust levels with perfect sensor feedback.
5.1.2 Comparisons With No Failures Induced
Table XXII shows the Steady State estimation errors and resulting thrust
variations for the fifteen flight operating conditions with no failures
induced. Since the parameter synthesis technique reverts to the synthesized
signal only in the presence of a failure, the no-failure case results in no
estimation errors. The advanced detection, isolation and accommodation concept
feeds back the Kalman filter estimates to the control law. Therefore, estima-
tion errors on the sensor inputs are present. The magnitude of estimation
errors is a function of the accuracy of the model within the algorithm.
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From Table XXII, it is seen that the estimation errors for the advanced algo-
rithm vary as a function of flight condition. As noted in Section 4.1.3,
increasing the linear data available for generating the model at the higher
error flight conditions and improving modeling techniques could significantly
reduce these estimation errors. This Table also shows that the fan turbine
inlet temperature estimator is the driving force for the large estimation
errors at many flight conditions. Therefore, additional work would be required
on that portion of the estimator prior to implementing it in control system
hardware. Since the fan turbine inlet temperature estimator was shown to be
very inaccurate, it was not considered in the steady state comparison.
5.1.3 Comparisons With a PT6 Sensor Failure Induced
Steady State comparisons for the two detection, isolation and accommodation
algorithms' accommodation of a PT6 sensor failure are shown on Table XXIII.
This Table shows very good steady state PT6 failure accommodation for both the
parameter synthesis and the advanced algorithm. The PT6 accommodation error
for the parameter synthesis technique results in a maximum variation in thrust
of 1.7% with very little variation in fan or compressor surge margins. The
advanced algorithm shows estimation errors up to 50% thrust variation at the
high altitude, high Macn number conditions. However, these errors are
comprised of two portions: 1) the basic estimation errors with no sensor
failures which were previously shown in Table XXII to be a function of
modeling errors; and 2) the accommodation errors resulting from zeroing a
column of the 'K' matrix in the Kalman filter.
To put the accommodation errors in perspective, one must examine the error
shown on the sensor fai-lure tables relative to the no-failure case. For
example, for the sea level static, 83° PLA flight operating point, the total
thrust variation when accommodating a PT6 failure with the advanced algorithm
relative to the perfect sensor feedback case is shown to be -2.5%. On Table
XXI, the no failure case was shown to result in a thrust variation of -3%
relative to the perfect sensor feedback case. Thus accommodation of a PT6
failure actually reduced the total thrust variation from -3% to -2.5%.
Table XXIV shows a summary of the advanced detection, isolation and accommoda-
tion algorithm's estimation errors at sea level static, 83° PLA. The total
estimation error is the sum of the basic estimator error with no sensor
failures and the accommodation error which results from zeroing a column of
the "K" matrix in the Kalman filter. This table shows little or no variation
in the estimation error between the no failure case and the sensor failure
cases. This illustrates that the algorithm's accommodation error is very small.
5.1.4 Comparisons With an Nl Sensor Failure Induced
Steady state comparison of the two algorithms accommodation for an Nl sensor
failure is shown in Table XXV. This Table shows good steady state Nl failure
accommodation for both the parameter synthesis and the advanced algorithm at
most flight operating points. The parameter synthesis algorithm's worst
negative thrust variations occur at low power conditions and the worst
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positive errors occur at high power, both of which, could be reduced with
minor power lever adjustments by the pilot. The parameter synthesis algorithm
did not respond well at 65k/2.5 due to a multivariable control stability prob-
lem which resulted in exceeding the operating range of the Nl parameter
synthesis curve. This could be rectified by extending the parameter synthesis
curves, however, since the cause of the problem was a control stability prob-
lem, it was not felt to be worthwhile.
The advanced algorithm shows good accommodation to an Nl failure at most con-
ditions where the fan turbine inlet temperature estimator is not the controll-
ing loop (65k ft/1.2Mn, 65k ft/2.5Mn). At 10k ft/0.9Mn and 45k ft/0.9Mn, a
control stability problem is experienced after the failure is accommodated. It
is felt that this problem could be rectified by improving the Kalman filter
gains. At the remaining conditions, the thrust variation is less than 6.5%
with little variation in fan or compressor surge margin.
5.1.5 Comparisons With an N2 Sensor Failure Induced
A comparison of steady state accommodation of an N2 speed sensor failure for
the two algorithms is shown in Table XXVI. Both algorithms accommodate an N2
failure with little variation in thrust, fan surge margin, or compressor
margin. The parameter synthesis algorithm limits thrust variation for an N2
failure accommodation to 4.4% except at 65k ft/2.5Mn where the thrust varia-
tion is larger but still limited to less than 10%. At 24k ft/1.8Mn, the para-
meter synthesis algorithm does suffer a 5.4% loss in compressor surge margin,
however, it still has adequate surge protection (9% compressor surge margin).
The advanced detection, isolation and accommodation algorithm is shown to
experience only minimal additional performance degradation when accommodating
an N2 sensor failure. At 50k ft/.9Mn, the system was slightly unstable when
accommodating an N2 sensor failure, however, the magnitude of the oscillation
was minimal.
5.1.6 Comparisons With an PT4 Sensor Failure Induced
A comparison of the two algorithms' steady state accommodation to a PT4 sensor
failure is shown in Table XXVII. This Table shows an acceptable amount of
steady state thrust variation resulting from accommodation of the failure. At
some conditions both algorithms experienced difficulty accurately detecting
and isolating the PT4 failure. At four flight operating points (0 ft/OMn 83°
PLA; 0 ft/OMn 130° PLA; 0 ft/1.2Mn 83° PLA; 10k ft/0.9Mn 83° PLA) the para-
meter synthesis algorithm detected a failure, but was unable to pinpoint the
failure to the PT4 sensor. Referring to the parameter synthesis curve set
shown in Figure 74, the four failure cases detected the failure by going out
of tolerance on curve 2. Since curve 2 can be out of tolerance by itself for
an N2 drift or a PT4 drift depending on the flight condition, it does not
provide adequate information to isolate the sensor failure. To isolate a
failure to PT4, curve 1 must also be out of tolerance with the sensed signal.
Since the tolerance bands on curve 1 were sized to provide adequate margin for
curve read errors at the higher altitude conditions, a large sensor drift is
required at the lower altitude condition to drive the curve out of tolerance
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with the sensor measurement. A biasing technique could be implemented (perhaps
a PT2 bias) to reduce the tolerance band for curve 1 at the lower altitude
conditions. However, since the non-isolated failure has only minimal effect on
engine performance, the additional complexity of a biasing technique would be
of questionable value.
The advanced algorithm also had difficulties isolating the PT4 failure at some
flight operating conditions. This problem could be reduced by improving the
simplified model's accuracy and redesigning the failure isolation tolerance
bands.
5.1.7 Comparisons With a Fan Turbine Inlet Temperature Sensor Failure Induced
The two detection, isolation and accommodation algorithm's steady state accom-
modation to a fan turbine inlet temperature sensor failure was evaluated at a
few flight operating points. It became evident that neither system provided
adequate. protection when operating on the synthesized or estimated value.
These results are consistent with previous in-house studies which showed the
accuracy of a synthesized signal to provide inadequate temperature limiting
protection. With the advanced concept, however, improving the accuracy of the
modeling approach within the algorithm may significantly improve the accuracy
of the fan turbine inlet temperature estimate to insure adequate engine pro-
tection. This should be evaluated in future studies.
5.2 TYPICAL FAILURE TRANSIENTS
When the steady state sensor failures were induced, the resulting perturbation
on engine performance was observed. For most conditions, there was less fail-
ure/accommodation transient with the advanced detection, isolation and accom-
modation algorithm than with parameter synthesis. This was expected since the
parameter synthesis technique requires a switching from a sensor measurement
to a synthesized signal to accommodate a sensor failure, whereas the advanced
algorithm is always feeding back estimator values. To accommodate a sensor
failure, the advanced failure detection, isolation and accommodation algorithm
reconfigures the normal mode filter to eliminate the failed sensor from the
computation of the estimated values.
Figure 75 compares the failure transients of pertinent engine performance
parameter for a typical sensor failure. The time histories shown result from
an N2 failure occurring at a time of 3.0 seconds at the sea level static, 83°
PLA flight operating point. The parameter synthesis case shows a failure
transient of 255 pounds thrust variation compared to the advanced algorithm's
60 pound thrust variation, however, after the failure transient decay, the
parameter synthesis case shows 52 pounds of thrust less accommodation error.
5.3 DETECTION/ISOLATION ACCURACY
To compare the detection and isolation performance of the parameter synthesis
and advanced algorithms, slow sensor drifts were simulated at the flight
operating conditions shown to be the most sensitive to in-range failure in the
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Failure Mode and Effects Critical Analysis (FMECA). When the failure was
detected and isolated, the magnitudes of the bias and thrust variation were
recorded, as tabulated in Table XXVIII. Nl drifts were not included in this
study since the analysis showed that in-range Nl failures rarely occurred.
As shown in Table XXVIII, the advanced algorithm is less sensitive to PT6,
PT4, and fan turbine inlet temperature drifts than the parameter synthesis
based algorithm. The PT4 drift, for example, is detected and isolated as a
failure for smaller magnitudes of drift with the parameter synthesis technique
(32 psi compared to 44.3 psi with the advanced concept). However, the
parameter synthesis based on algorithm experienced a -5.4% larger thrust
degradation prior to accommodation than was experienced with the advanced
algorithm. The reduced performance degradation with the advanced concept
results from the Kalman filter gains being sized to place the highest
weighting on the N2 speed signal and considerably less weighting on the PT4,
PT6, FTIT, and Nl signals. Therefore, when the PT4 signal was drifted, the
estimated sensor values changed only slightly for a large magnitude of drift.
Conversely, when the .N2 signal was drifted, the estimated sensor values
followed the N2 sensor drift resulting in significant performance degradation
(greater than 10% thrust change) and difficulties in failure detection and
isolation.
TABLE XXVIII
Parameter Synthesis/Detection, Isolation and Accommodation
Concept 2 Sensor Failure Detection Comparisons
Flight Parameter Synthesis DIA Concept 2
Operating Sensor Bias be- FNT be- Bias be- FNT be-
Point Drift fore DIA fore DIA Comments fore DIA fore DIA Comments
0/0 20° • PT6 drifted +12.7 PSI -3.5%
PLA Positive
0/0 83° PT4 drifted +32 PSI -5.6%
PLA Positive
0/1.2 FTIT drifted +78°F -20.3%
83°PLA Positive
20k/0.3 N2 drifted +473 RPM -3.2%
83°PLA Positive
20k/0.3 N2 drifted -390
83°PLA Negative
+5*68 PSI +0.1%
+44.3 PSI -0.2%
+2.3%
+1419 RPM -6.5% FTIT false
occuring @
666 RPM N2
Bias.
undetected +10.5% FTIT and Nl
false alarms
Nl and N2
overspeed
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Figures 76 and 77 show time histories of pertinent engine and performance
parameters responding to a PT4 drift with the parameter synthesis based algo-
rithm and the advanced algorithm respectively. The thrust variations shown on
these figures are calculated relative to the "perfect" sensor feedback case.
As shown in Figure 77, the advanced algorithm's sensor estimates respond only
slightly to the PT4 drift, resulting in only a minor performance degradation
over no-failure operation. Figure 75 shows a similar failure scenario for the
parameter synthesis based algorithm experiencing a larger performance degrada-
tion prior to isolation, however, after isolation, the parameter synthesis
based algorithm accommodates the failure more accurately than the advanced
algorithm.
Figures 78 and 79 show time histories of pertinent engine and performance
parameters responding to an N2 drift with the parameter synthesis based algo-
rithm and the advanced algorithm, respectively. The thrust variations shown on
these figures are calculated relative to the "perfect" sensor feedback case.
As shown in Figure 79, the advanced algorithm's sensor estimates respond con-
siderably to the N2 sensor drift, and this results in significant performance
degradation. For this particular failure case, the parameter synthesis algo-
rithm's detection and isolation performance was shown to be more accurate than
the advanced DIA algorithm. The parameter synthesis algorithm detected and
isolated the N2 drift at time of 4.4 seconds, whereas, the advanced algorithm
detected a failure at 5.656 seconds and isolated it to fan turbine inlet
temperature at 5.664 seconds. A second failure was detected at 7.222 seconds
and isolated to the Nl sensor at 7.230 seconds. Therefore, the advanced
algorithm had two false alarms and never correctly isolated the failure to the
N2 sensor.
This study showed that for all sensor failures, except PT6, the parameter
synthesis algorithm detects and isolates the sensor failure for a smaller mag-
nitude of drift than the advanced detection, isolation and accommodation
algorithm. However, even with the larger magnitudes of drifts the effects on
engine performance are smaller with the advanced algorithm for all sensor
drifts with the exception of N2. Since the Kalman filter gains were sized to
place the highest weighting on the N2 sensor input to improve filter response,
the estimated values followed the N2 sensor drift thereby making it difficult
to detect the failure. Therefore, the weighting on the other inputs should be
increased to avoid the situation when a drift in one sensor can cause a signi-
ficant decrease in engine performance and a drift in the remaining sensors has
negligible effect.
5.4 TRANSIENT FAILURE COMPARISONS
Sensor failures were induced during large perturbation transients to compare
the transient detection and isolation capability as well as observe the en-
gine's transient behavior when operating with accommodation of failed sensors.
All transient sensor failures were induced 1.0 second after the power lever
snap. A summary of the results is shown in Table XXIX.
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Table XXIX shows consistently good transient detection and isolation with the
parameter synthesis based algorithm. During the transient, fan turbine inlet
temperature overshoots were observed. These overshoots result from operating
on an uncompensated signal and are on the same order of magnitude as the
no-failure case. At 0 ft/1.2Mn, when fan turbine inlet temperature is failed,
a steady state over-temperature is observed. This results from synthesizing
the signal to be lower than the reference.
The advanced detection, isolation and accommodation algorithm, as shown on
this Table, has problems with false alarms. The fan turbine inlet temperature
estimator consistently caused false alarms for most of the sensors failure
cases examined. Therefore, additional refinements of the model and algorithm
are required to correct this problem.
Generally, transients run with the advanced algorithm were slower. This
results from the fan turbine inlet temperature estimator reducing fuel flow
during the transient. The FTIT input signal used with the parameter synthesis
algorithm is an uncompensated signal which allows fuel flow to accelerate
faster, however, does result in more severe FTIT transient overshoots. A typi-
cal comparison of the two algorithms' transient behavior is shown on Figure
80. This figure shows good transient response when accommodating the PT4 fail-
ure with both algorithms despite the Nl false alarm which occurred with the
advanced algorithm. Additional plots of pertinent engine and performance
parameters for selected transient operation failure scenarios are included in
Appendix E.
5.5 MULTIPLE SENSOR FAILURES
Multiple sensor failures were simulated at sea level static to compare the two
algorithms capability to detect, isolate, and accommodate a second sensor
failure. For the failure scenarios examined, the advanced detection, isolation
and accommodation algorithm showed less performance degradation than the para-
meter synthesis algorithm. Figure 81 compares the thrust variations relative
to perfect sensor feedback case for the parameter synthesis based algorithm
and the advanced algorithm for a PT4/N2 multiple failure at sea level static,
83° PLA. As shown in this figure, the advanced algorithm suffers very little
additional performance degradation with the second failure (57 pound thrust
variation) whereas the parameter synthesis based algorithm shows a much larger
performance degradation (2100 pounds thrust variation). Similar results were
observed for the other multiple failure scenarios.
5.6 ACTUATOR FAILURES
oThe engine nozzle area actuator was slewed wide open at sea level static, 83
PLA, to simulate a hardover actuator failure. This test was conducted to
verify that the two detection, isolation and accommodation algorithms would
not confuse the actuator failure with a sensor failure. This test showed that
neither the parameter synthesis algorithm nor the advanced algorithm falsely
detected a sensor failure when the actuator failure was induced.
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SECTION 6.0
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The following results and conclusions result from this study:
1. Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis Results:
a. An analysis of failure characteristics for the state-of-the-art sen-
sors selected for the F100 multivariable control mode showed that the
majority of the sensor failures recorded were out-of-range failures(90 percent for speed sensors and pressure sensors and 75 percent for
temperature sensors). Since 90% failure coverage is not satisfactory
for most control applications, there is a need for detection, isola-
tion, and accommodation algorithms to provide in-range failure
coverage.
b. All out-of-range sensor failures exhibit critical failure character-
istics with the FIDO mu.ltivariable control mode. Critical is defined
as failures that result in a fan or compressor surge, excessive
thrust variation (greater than 10*), or a rotor overspeed above the
operating limits.
c. In-range failures (drifts) of the N2, TT2, TT25, FTIT, PT2, PT6, and
PT4 sensors are also shown to exhibit critical failure characteris-
tics and therefore, require either sensor redundancy or analytical
redundancy to ensure continued operation in the event of a sensor
failure.
2. Simplified nonlinear engine models were developed for use in advanced
algorithms for sensor failure detection, isolation, and accommodation. The
models worked well except at high altitude (greater than 45K ft) or high
Mach number conditions (greater than 1.2). The problems that arose at
these conditions were found to result from an insufficient number of
linear models available to constrain the curve fitting procedure for the
matrix elements at these flight conditions. Therefore, it is concluded
that generating more linear models and improving the curve fits will
significantly improve the accuracy of the algorithm at the high altitude
and high Mach number conditions.
3. Numerous advanced concepts for detecting, isolating and accommodating
sensor failures can be developed based upon such techniques as Kalman
filters. A screening process led to the selection in this program of an
advanced concept which uses a Kalman filter to generate residuals, a
weighted Sum Squared residual technique to detect soft failures, Like-
lihood Ratio testing of a bank of Kalman filters (each designed with one
input missing) for isolation, and reconfiguring of the normal mode Kalman
filter by eliminating the failed input to accommodate the failure. This
was shown to be a feasible detection, isolation, and accommodation
algorithm.
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4. During the final screening process; the advanced DIA Concept 2, described
in conclusion 3, was selected to be the most viable concept for detailed
evaluation and comparison against the baseline parameter synthesis tech-
nique. The rationale for selecting Concept 2 are as follows:
1. Since concept 2 uses maximum information (all other sensors) to
generate estimates of each parameter it is least sensitive to model
errors.
2. The fault information is in the innovations. This allows concept 2 to
respond quickly to sensor failures.
3. Concept 2 provides good signal conditioning when no sensor failures
are present.
5. The parameter synthesis concept developed under this program provided a
viable baseline for comparison against the advanced concept. This compari-
son showed that the advanced concept was also a viable technique for
detecting, isolating and accommodating sensor failures.
6. Parameter Synthesis/Advanced DIA Concept Comparisons:
a. The advanced concept feeds back the estimator values to the control
laws which result in a steady state hangoff (estimation error) with no
induced sensor failures. This estimation error varies as a function of
of flight condition due to the modelling errors previously noted in
conclusion 2.
b. Steady state comparisons between the parameter synthesis and the
advanced concepts showed both to have very good detection, isolation,
and accommodation for PT6, PT4, Ml, and N2 sensor failures at most
operating points.
c. Neither the parameter synthesis nor the advanced concept provides ade
quate FTIT protection when operating on the synthesized or estimated
value. These results are consistent with previous in-house studies
which showed the accuracy of a synthesized signal provides inadequate
temperature limiting protection. With the advanced concept, however,
improving the accuracy of the modeling approach within the algorithm
may significantly improve the accuracy of the FTIT estimates.
d. For most conditions evaluated, there was less failure/accommodation
transient with the advanced concept than with the parameter synthesis
concept.
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f. With the exception of PT6, the parameter synthesis algorithm detects
and isolates the sensor failure for a smaller magnitude of drift than
the advanced detection, isolation and accommodation algorithm. How-
ever, even with the larger magnitudes of drifts the effects on engine
performance are smaller with the advanced algorithm for all sensor
drifts with the exception of N2. Since the Kalman filter gains were
designed to place the highest weighting on the N2 sensor input, the
estimated values tracked the drifted input signal which made the
advanced concept unable to detect and isolate the sensor failure.
Refinements to the algorithm are required to redistribute the weight-
ing of the Kalman filter gains among the other inputs to avoid the
situation when a drift in one sensor can cause a significant decrease
in engine performance and a drift in the remaining sensors has
negligible effect.
h. The advanced concept showed less performance degradation than the
parameter synthesis concept for the multiple sensor failure scenarios
examined.
The implementation of failure logic in a control system can have signifi-
cant impact on computational requirements and, hence, the design of the
digital control. Therefore, the control designer should evaluate the
failure rates and failure modes of each sensor and apply sophisticated
concepts only where warranted to insure the result is the simplest and
most cost-effective control system which provides desired operational
benefits and mission reliability.
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Section 7.0
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Refine the simplified simulation within the advanced DIA concept to im-
prove the performance of the concept. Refinement to the simplified simula-
tion should include: 1) improving the steady state accuracy by increasing
the number of linear models used to constrain the curve fitting procedure
for the matrix elements over the desired flight envelope, and 2) improving
the dynamic portion of the simplified simulation to be comparable with the
nonlinear simulation.
2. Develop refinements to the advanced DIA algorithm to: 1) insure that the
logic is compatable with the revised simplified engine simulation, and 2)
minimize the steady state estimator hangoff errors.
3. Develop algorithm simplifications to the DIA algorithm to reduce the
complexity of a microprocessor based real-time control implementation of
the DIA algorithm.
4. Implement the revised algorithm on a microprocessor for detailed evalu-
ation utilizing a real-time engine model and eventual engine test.
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APPENDIX A
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
The following paragraph summarizes the predominant causes of in-range sensor
failures.
Speed Sensor Failure
In-range failures of the Nl system may be caused by the following:
o Failure of the Divide by 2 circuit causing a degredation in high speed
range.
o Open circuit on an Nl connector pin resulting in loss of up to 1/2 word
o Failure in mux switch resulting in using high speed counter in low speed
range.
Nl Accuracy = +3 rpm
Nl Operating Limits = 4500 - 10200 rpm
Nl Range Limits = 1300 - 13000 rpm
In-range failures of the N2 system may be caused by the following:
o Failure of the lamination stack or winding
o Failure in the Divide by a circuitry resulting in a division by 4 or 2
o N2 Period Counter and Control failures causes loss of 1/2 word, or random
bit pattern, or counts for the wrong number of periods.
N2 Accuracy =? +3 rpm
N2 Operating Limits = 7000 to 13000 rpm
N2 Range Limits = 1300 to 15000 rpm
Temperature Sensor System Failures
In-range failures of the TT2, TT2.5, and FTIT systems may be caused by the
fol1owi ng:
o Open circuit in one or more of the probes, junctions of a probe or
temperature measurement circuits of the control.
o Short circuit or ground in the TT2 or TT2.5 or FTIT probe or temperature
measurement circuits of the control
125
o Failure of a particular gain amplifier
TT2 Accuracy = +7°F
TT2 Operating Limits = -50 to +200°F
TT2 Range Limits = -110 to +440°F
TT2.5 Accuracy = +7°F
TT2.5 Operating Limits = -50 to +695°F
TT2.5 Range Limits = -110 to 840°F
FTIT Accuracy = +12°F
FTIT Operating Limits = FTlTbase to FTITbase +1030°F
FTIT Range Limits = -65°F to FTITbase +1999°F
Pressure Sensor Failures
In-range failures of the pressure sense systems PT2, PT4, and PT6 may be
attributed to the following types of failures:
o Failure of the probe or pressure tubing
o In-range frequency shifts of the vibrating cylinder
o Loss of 1/2 word or random bit pattern from the Period Counter/Control
o Power strobe of only one PROM causing no effect on the signal which is
properly strobed. The other signals are wrong, and possible in range.
o Power strobe two PROM's with results similar to above except that the
unstrobed signal is wrong, possibly in range.
PT2 Accuracy = +.03 psi
PT2 Operating Limits = "3" to 30 psi a
PT4 Accuracy = _+.4 psi
PT4 Operating Limits = 40 to 500 psia
PT4 Range Limits = 1 to 599 psia
PT6 Accuracy = +.07 psi
PT6 Operating Limits = 7 to 60 psia
PT6 Range Limits = 1 to 109.8 psia
Tabulation of the results of failing each sensor to their upper and lower
out-of-range limits are shown on the following tables and are summarized on
pages 150 and 151.
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APPENDIX B
DIA SCORING SYSTEM
Mathematical equations which were derived to quantitatively score each
candidate DIA algorithm for both detection and accommodation criteria are
described in the following appendix.
ENGINE PROTECTION
Critical Design Limit Y
Control Limit
Threshold
CR
'CL
'TH
With DIA Concept
VDIA(t>
Nominal Response Y (t)
NML
General Ground Rule: Decrease score for how much a limited parameter
exceeds a limit due to sensor failures interacting
with the control mode during transients and steady
state operation.
General Scoring Formula:
If Y (t) > Y ;
DIA TH
SCY (t) = [AMAX1 (0.0, SGN * [Y (t) - Y (t)])] * WTFC
DIA NML
Where: WTFC = Weighting Factor =
[ WT2
CR NML
] * [[AMAX1 (0.0, SGN*[Y (t) - Y ])] *
TTJ DIA CL
SGN* [ WT2
Y -Y
CR CL
1.0]
SCY(t) = Time Varying Scoring
SGN = Sign (either +1 or -1)
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YDIA(t)= Parameter Response With Dia Concept
YNMl_(t)= Nominal Parameter Response
WT1 = Weighting Constant
WT2 = Weighting Constant
YCR = Critical Operating Limit
YCL = Control Limit
Y = Threshold, Above Which, Scoring Formula Is Executed
TH
This equation will penalize a DIA concept if the engine protection parameter
exceeds its respective nominal characteristics for operation above a threshold
value. The scoring weighting factor (WTFC) is a function of the proximity of
the nominal characteristics [YNML^ )] relative to the critical design limit
This weighting factor is increased if the DIA concept exceeds the control
limits. The weighting constants (WT1 and WT2) require different constant for
steady state than transient operation. Since it is more critical to exceed
the control limits in steady state than transiently, WT2 is weighed more
heavily than WT1 in steady state. For transient operation, excursions above
nominal operation is of more concern; therefore, WT1 is weighed more heavily.
Total Score (for each parameter)
/N \
TSCORE = (£ SCY(t)) /N
\ 0 /
Where N = Number of points run.
N is only increased by 1 for "quasi-steady state operation.-It is therefore
necessary to be aware if the system is in steady state for both the total
score, and to determine the correct weighting factors. This may be done by
either programming, as a function of time, a schedule indicating when steady
state operation is expected (from the power lever profile), or, using simple
logic, as shown on Figure 1. This figure shows simple logic which could be
implemented; however, programming a steady state flag may be more desirable,
since this type of logic could give erroneous results if the DIA concept was
unresponsive to an input; i.e., transient should be occuring, yet the DIA
algorithm results in steady state operation.
Constants (for engine protection parameters)
Note: Weighting factors designed to give a score of 5 at Ycr
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Temperature limits (FTIT)
WT1
WT2
SGN = +1
Speed Limits
Steady State
1.125
3.5
Transiently
4.5
0.125
, YCL = YTH + 25°C, YTH = FTITbase +563°C
WT1
WT2
YCR
SPN
Nl
WT1
WT2
Steady State
1.125
3.5
13720, YCL = f(T2), YTH = YCL - i°° RpM
+1
Steady State
1.125
3.5
SGN = +1
= 12000, YCL = H500, YTH = 11000
Pressure Limits (Pb)
WT1
WT2
YCR
SGN
TBD,
+1
Steady State
1.125
3.5
YTH = 550
Transiently
4.5
0.125
Transiently
4.5
0.125
Transiently
4.5
0.125
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Engine Stability
Fan and Compressor Stall Margins
The ground rule for fan and compressor stability is to not allow fan stall
margin to go below 0.15 or compressor stall margin to go below 0.05. Stall
margin is defined by:
SM = ["(Pressure Ratio Stall - Pressure Ratio Operating)"!
L P r e s s u r e Ratio S t a l l J At constant airflow
The same equation set is used as was used for engine protection. Note: The
value of "SGN" is -1.0 to reflect that a higher surge margin is more desirable.
Note: Weighting factor designed to give a score of 7.5 at SM = 0.
Fan
WT1
WT2
YCR = o, YCL = 15, YTH = is
SGN = -1
Compressor
Steady State
1.25
5
Transiently
1.25
5
Steady State
1.25
5
Transiently
1.25
5
WT1
WT2
YCR = o, YCL = 5, YTH • 8
SGN = -1.0
Steady State Performance and Accuracy
Variation from nominal thrust will be scored for steady state operation at
fixed PLA.
SCY (t) = FNNML" FNDIA
FNNML
MLSS
10% variation in thrust from nominal will score 15 pts.
Steady State
MLSS = 150
Transiently
0
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Transient Requirements
o Based on time to 90% thrust change (assumes only perform tests for parts
of the PLA profile where 90% thrust change occurs)
o 10% overshoot over references (Ml, EPR) considered critical (only
performed during parts of the PLA transient where referenced value is
exceeded)
SCY (t) [AMAX1 (0.0, [TRDIA - TRNML] )] * MLTR
+ [AMAX1 (0.0, [OSoiAN - OSNMLN] ) / (0-1 * N1REF)]
* MLNOS + [AMAX1 (0.0, [ OSoiAE - OSNMLE] ) / (0.1 * EPRREF)]
* MLEOS
Where:
TRDIA = Tl'me to 90^ Thrust Change for DIA Concept
TRNML = Time to 90% Thrust Change for Nominal Response
OSoiAN = M Overshoot, DIA Concept
OSoiAE = EPR Overshoot, DIA Concept
OSNMLN = Nominal Nl Overshoot
OSNMLE = Nominal EPR Overshoot
Steady State Transiently
MLTR = 0 5
MLNOS = 0 5
MLEOS = 0 5
For total score for steady state accuracy and transient response, use same
TSCORE equation used in engine protection and engine stability.
DIA Detection Performance (50 PTS)
Hit/Miss Ratio
50% will score 20 PTS
DSCORE = NIF " NOH * 40
RTF
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Where:
NIF = Number of induced failures
NOH = Number of Hits
Time to Detect (15 PTS Score)
Rational: The advanced electronic control design for the F100 engine takes
108 ms to detect a failure; therefore, the concept is penalized
for times greater than this. A 300 ms detect time results in the
worst score.
The concept is penalized for excessive thrust change between when
the falure was induced to when the failure was detected for steady
state operation. A 10% thrust variation results in worst score.
Scoring Equation:
DSCORE = [AMAX1 [0., (TFD - TFI - 108)]) / 192] * WTTD
+ FNTI - FNTD * WTF
FTTH
Where:
TFD = Time Failure Detected
TFI = Time Failure Induced
FMTI = Thrust When Failure Induced
FNTD = Thrust When Falure Detected
Steady State Transiently
WITD 5 15
WTF 100 0
Number of False Alarms
Ground Rule:
for every 10 hits, one false alarm is tolerable, three false
alarms scores 15 PTS
Scoring: NOFA * 50 = DSCORE
NOH
Where:
NOFA = Number of False Alarms
NOH = Number of Hits
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APPENDIX C
LINEAR MODEL DEVELOPMENT
A representative model should describe engine behavior over the entire flight
envelope. The flight envelope was parametrically investigated (Reference 1) to
identify portions where limiting boundaries were approached. The envelope was
then partitioned into linearization regions, wherein each region shares bound-
aries with other regions and the envelope boundary. These linearization re-
gions encompassed a region where operating characteristics were critical to
some limiting variable. Model generation points were chosen to span the
envelope and center on the linearization regions. A set of linear equations
models the important dynamics in a linearization region and about an equili-
brium point. For the locally linear models to operate throughout the flight
envelope adaptability to ambient parameters is required.
The thermodynamic equations which describe turbine engines are nonlinear, and
in general may be written as
x = f [x(t) , u(t) , e(t)]
where x(t) represents the dynamic variables, u(t) represents the controls, and(t) represents ambient parameters. Relationships of non-dynamic variables can
be represented as nonlinear, static equations as follows:
y(t) = h [x(t) , u(t) , e(t) ] (2)
The nonlinear equations (1) and (2) describe state and ouput time histories,
x(t), y(t) for given control and ambient inputs, u(t), o(t); where t t0,
and initial state, x0 = x(t0). Simultaneously solving equations (1) and(2) typically require high computational capability. In addition, even large-
scale digital or hybrid simulations do not produce observed behaviour exactly.
A simplified model reduces the computational burden considerably while still
representing acceptable engine behaviours. A detailed description of model
development is given in reference (1). Utilizing the perturbational quantities
to equations (1) and (2) the following linear equations result:
9 (3)
6x = F(t) 6x + G(t) 6U + Q(^ )
9 (4)
6y = H(t) 6x + D(t) 6u + 9(6*)
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where
F(t) = u0(t). e(t)]
6X x = xQ(t)
G(t) =
UQ(t), 8(t)]
u = uQ(t) (5)
The term 6x is an n x 1 vector of states, 6u is an m x 1 vector of controls,
and 6y is a p x 1 output vector. The F, G, H, and D terms in 8y representing
the compatibly dimensioned state dynamics matrix, control distribution matrix,
and output distribution matrices, respectively. Ignoring second order pertur-
bational quantities and assuming that the dynamics matrices are constant
within a region of state space, then equations (3) and (4) reduce to linear
constant coefficient, differential equations:
6X = F 6X + G 6U (6)
6y = H Sx + D 6u (7)
The linear models are valid in the neighborhood of an equilibrium point (x0,
"o» &o) and describe perturbational motion 5x, 6y away from equilibrium.
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APPENDIX D
MODAL DECOMPOSITION
Simplified, low order, linear models are derived from the high order linear
models using a modal reduction procedure discussed in reference (1). High-
lights of the procedure are discussed below.
The linear equations (6) and (7) (Appendix C) can be transferred to block
diagonal form assuming the n x n dynamics matrix, F, has no repeated eigen
values:
ex - Tz (8)
which gives
2 = AZ + Z6U
6y = HTz + D6u
where A is an n x n block diagonal matrix, T is an n x n matrix composed of
the column eigenvectors F; z is an n x 1 modal coordinate vector; and 2, is the
n x 1 modal control distribution matrix. The system of equations (8) through
(10) can be partitioned into a set of q states and of q eigenvalues and n - q
states and eigenvalues as follows:
f6xil Tii :T i2lfz i i
 m)
• • •• = v • v* • I I • • • \< 1 1L6X2J LT2i : T2zJ L Z2i
where 5 x-| , and zi , are q x 1 vectors partitioning the state and modes and
5x2 and Z2 are in-q) * 1 vectors partitioning the remaining states and
modes.
If within the time frame of interest, the following relatonship is true:
2 «0 (13)
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then the following reduction can be made
6
*1 = Fr 6xl + Gr 6u 04)
where XT, is now the q x 1 state vector, F is the q x q dynamics matrix, and
G is the q x m control distribution matrix. Also:
|
6x,
«4
where X2 is treated as an additional (n-q) x 1 output vector with a (n-q) x
q state distribution matrix H* and a (n-q) x m control distribution matrix
D*. The original output distribution matrices, H and D, are modified to H
and D respectively. The equations for these matrices in terms of model
decomposition are:
Fr = Tll AI V1 (
Gr = Tll <A1 Til"1 T12 V1 Z2 + Zl)
H 9 )
D
*
 = (T21 Tll"1 T12 - T22} A2* E2 (20)
H = H + H H* (21 )
Dr = D + H2 D* (22)
Thus by assuming (n-q) modes are equilibrated, the nth order system (6) is
reduced to the qth order system (14) with q state and B+n-q outputs.
A block diagram of the model reduction process is shown in Figure D-l
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NONLINEAR MODELS
LINEARIZATION
REDUCE ORDER OF MODELS
ACCURATELY
DESCRIBE
DYNAMICS
DESIRED REDUCED
ORDER MODELS
Figure D-l Generation of Design Models
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APPENDIX E
TYPICAL TRANSIENT OPERATION COMPARISONS
The following figures present additional transient failure operation scenarios
comparisons between the selected advanced concept and the baseline parameter
synthesis concept.
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to
Q_
w
44
40
36
32
28
24
20
16
1000
800
600
400
200
0'
0220
0200
0180
0160
0140
0120;
0100
0190
0180
0170
0160
0150
0140
0130
FT6SCH
OiccI
100p
90 -
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
FTISCH
P6 ACTUAL
I
u
44
40
36
32
28
24
20
16
1000
8UO
600
400
200
0
0220
0200
0180
0160
0140
0120
0100
0080
0190
0180
0170
P6 ESTIMATE
V) 0160
0150
0140
100
90
80
70LU
O
<
o
n.
so -
40 -
30 -
20 -
10 -
P6 SCH
FTIT
(TIT ESTIMATE
FTISCH
2 4 6
TIME
8 10 12 2 4 6 8
TIME
10 12
NOTE PT6 FAILED 30 PSI AT TIME = 4 SEC
Figure E-l Failure Transient Comparisons at Sea Level Static Conditions and
20° to 83° PLA Snap PT6 Sensor Failed
154
Parameter synthesis Advanced DIA algorithm
12,800
12,400
12,000
11,600
g 11,200
10,800
10,400
10,000
9,600
9,200
500
400
I »
100
0
0200
< 0180
if) 0160
0140
0120
0440
0400
0360
JJ 0320
M 0280
0240
0200
0160
O
1001-
90 -
80 -
70 -
60-
50-
40 -
30-
20 -
10 -
N2 ACTUAL
SNCSCH-
SYNTHESIS
FTISCH -
(TIT SYNTHESIS
14,000
13,000
g 12.000
11,000
10,000
9,000
1000
800
600
Jl 400
200
0
-200
0320
0280
< 0240
W 0200
0160
0120
0.260
0.240
0220
.. 0200
0180
0160
0140
0120
5
O
I
o
CE
100 -
90 -
80 -
70 -
60 -
50-
40 -
30 -
20 -
10 -
0 -
SNCSCH
-4 -2 4 6
TIME
8 10 12
-4 -2 4 6
TIME
8 10 12
•NOTE: N2 FAILED 2000 RPM AT TIME =40 SECONDS
Figure E-2 Failure Transient Comparisons at 20,000 ft/0.3 Mn Conditions and
83° to 24° PLA Snap Decel. at Time = 3.0 Seconds N2 Sensor Failed
155
I
<
<
CO
o
i
#
Ul
Z
O
Itr
Parameter synthesis
SNCSCH
Advanced DIA algorithm
12,400
12,000
11,600
11,200
10,800
10,400
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0240
0230
0220
0210
0200
0190
0180
0140
0120
0100
0080
0060
0040
0020
0000
100>-
90
80
70
60
SO
40
30
20
10
N2 ACTUAL
N2 SENSED
FTISCH
(TIT SYNTHESIS
12,400
12,000
11,600
11,200
10,800
10,400
800
700
600
500
i—
400
300
200
100
0
0230
0220
0210
< 0200
W
 0190
0180
0170
0140
0120
0100o
to
o
(O
DCI
0080
0060
0040
lOOp
90 -
80
70 -
60 -
50
40
30 -
20
10
N2SCH
N2 ACTUAL
N2 ESTIMATE
.FTIT ESTIMATE
FTISCH
8 10 12 8 10 12
NOTE: N2 FAILED 2000 RPM AT TIME = 4.0 SECONDS
Figure E-3 Failure Transient Comparisons at 45,000 ft/0.90 Mn Conditions and
40° to 83° PLA Snap at Time = 3.0 Seconds N2 Sensor Failed
156
References
1. DeHoff, R.L., Hall, W.E., Adams, R.J., and Gupta, N.K., "F100
Multivan'able Control Synthesis Program—Volume 1, Developement of FIDO
Control System", AFAPL-TR-77-35, 1977.
2. DeHoff, R.L., Hall, W.E., Adams, R.J., and Gupta, N.K., "F100
Multi variable Control Synthesis Program—Vol ume II, Appendices A through
K", AFAPL-TR-77-35, 1977.
3. Miller, R.J., and Hackney, R.D., "FIDO Multivariable Control System Engine
Models/Design Criteria", Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group, Government
Products Division, AFAPL-TR-79-44, Nov. 1979.
4. Rock, S.M., and DeHoff, R.L., "Variable Cycle Engine Multivariable control
Synthesis, Interim Report - Control Structure Definition,"
AFAPL-TR-79-2043, Feb., 1979.
5. Akhter, M. M., Rock, S.M. and DeHoff, R.L., "Trajectory Generation
Techniques for Multivariable Control of Aircraft Turbine Engines",
Thirteenth Asilomar Conference on Circuits, Systems and Computers, Pacific
Grove California, Nov. 5 - 7 , 1979.
6. Willsky, A. S., "A Survey of Design Methods for Failure Detection in
Dynamic Systems", Automatica, Volume 12, PP 601-611, 1976.
7. Mehira, R. K., and Peschon, J., "An Innovations Approach to Fault
Detection and Diagnosis in Dynamic Systems", Automatica, Volume 7, PP
637-640, 1971.
8. Willsky, A. S., Deyst, J. 0. and Crawford, B. S., "Adaptive Filtering and
Self Test Methods for Failure Detection and Compensation", Proc. of the
JACC, Austin, Texas, June 1974.
9. Montgomery, R. C., and Price, D. B., "Management of Analytical Redundancy
in Digital Flight Control Systems for Aircraft", AIAA Mechanics and
Control of Flight Conference, Anaheim, CA, August 5-9, 1974.
10. Kerr, T. H., "A Two Ellipsoid Overlap Test For Real Time Failure Detection
And Isolation By Confidence Regions", Paper No. FA5.2, IEEE Conf. on
Decision and Cointrol, Phoenix, Arizona, November 1974.
11. Beard, R. V., "Failure Accommodation in Linear Systems Through Self
Reorganization" Report. MVT-71-1, Man Vehicle Laboratory, Cambridge,
Mass., Feb. 1971.
12. Jones, H. I., "Failure Detection in Linear Systems", Ph.D. Thesis, Dept.
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., Sept. 1973.
13. Jazwinski, A. H., "Limited Memory Optimal Filtering", IEEE Trans. Aut.
Control, Vol.13, 558 to 563 (1968).
14. Clark, R. N., Fosth, D. C., and Walton, V. M., "Detecting Instrument
Malfunctions in Control Systems", IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and
Electronic Systems, Vol. AES 11, No. 4, July 1975.
157
15. Broen, R. B., "A Nonlinear Voter Estimator for Redundant Systems", Proc.
1974, IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, Phoenix, Arizona, pp. 743-748.
16. Bueno, R., "Performance and Sensitivity Analysis of the GLR Method for
Failure Detection", S.M. thesis, Dept. of Aero, and Astro., M.I.T., 1976.
17. Chow, E. Y., "Analytical Studies of the Generalized Likelihood Ratio
Technique for Failure Detection", SmM. thesis, Dept. of Elec. Eng. and
Comp. Sci., M.I.T., Feb. 1976.
18. Gupta, N. K., Hall, W. E., "System Identification Methodology for Fault
Detection and Isolation in Dynamics Systems", Interim Report for period
January 1, 1976 to May 1, 1977, Prepared for Office of Naval Research,
Report ONR-CR-215-245-2, February 1, 1978.
19. Van Trees, H. L., Detection, Estimation and Modulation Theory, Part III:
Radar Sonar Signal Processing and Gaussian Signals in Noise, Wiley, New
York (1971).
20. Davis, M. H. A., "The Application of Nonlinear Filtering to Fault
Detection in Linear Systems", IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
April 1975.
21. Fagin, S. L., "Recursive Linear Regression Theorgy, Optimal Filter Theory,
and Error Analysis of Optimal Systems", IEEE Int. Conv. Record, March 1964.
22. Tarn, T. J., and Faborszky, J., "A Practical Non-diverging Filter", AIAA
Journal 8, 1970.
23. Luenberger, D. G., "An Introduction to Observers", IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, Vol. AC-16, No. 6, December 1971.
24. Papoulis, A., "Probability, Random Variables and Stochastic Processes",
McGraw Hill Book Company, New York (1965).
25. Montgomery, R.C., and Price, D.B., "Failure Accommodation in Digital
Flight Control Systems Accounting for Nonlinear Aircraft Dynamics", AIAA
Mechanics and Control of Flight Conference, Paper 74-887, Anaheim, CA.,
August 5-9, 1974.
26. Davis, M.H.A., "The Application of Nonlinear Filtering to Fault Detection
in Linear Systems", IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, April, 1975,
pp 257-259.
27. Schlee, F.H., Standish, C.J., and Toda, N.F., "Divergence in the Kalman
Filter", AIAA Journal, Vol. 5, June 1967, pp 1114-1120.
28. Fitzgerald, R.J., "Error Divergence in Optimal Filtering Problems", 2nd
IFAC Symposium on Automatic Control in Space, Vienna, Austria, September
1967.
158
LIST OF SYMBOLS
DIA Detection, Isolation and Accommodation
D-J Control to output distribution matrix corresponding to ith failure
F System Dynamics Matrix
FMECA Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis
FTIT Fan Turbine Inlet Temperature (°R)
G Control to state distribution matrix
GJ (k, 0) Effect of a failure of type; at time 6 on residual at time k
GLR Generalized Likelihood Ratio
HO Filter designed on the assumption of no failure
HD Filter designed on the assumption of failure present
T(.) Innovations process
Mi Threshold for isolation corresponding to ith channel
Z . Measurement output vector
*
Z Estimated output vector
p(7(.)/H-j) Probability density function corresponding to T(.) assumming
hypothesis Hj is true
P (0, 1) Normal density with zero mean and unit variance
AD Threshold for failure detection
X State vector
/\
X Estimated state vector
0 Failure parameter or failure state
A.
0 Estimated value of failure parameter
Xss Steady state value of state vector
Hi Hypothesis corresponding to ith failure
Mil.,- Bank of filters used in Concept 1 isolation technique; designed
on the assumption (hypothesis) of a bias present in ith measure-
ment
159
H2Ii Bank of filters used in Concept 2 isolation technique; designed
on the assumption (hypothesis) that ith measurement is faulty
and is ignored as the input to the filter
LR Likelihood Ratio
"?•,•(.) Innovations produced by filter corresponding to i^n failure
y Mean value of innovations
a
 Standard deviation
Mn Mach number
MVC Multivariable Control
Nl Fan Speed (rpm)
N1C2 Corrected low rotor speed
N2 Compressor Speed (rpm)
N2C2 Corrected high rotor speed
PLA Power Lever Angle (degrees)
PT2 Engine Face Pressure (psia)
PT4 Burner Pressure (psia)
PT6 Augmentor Total Pressure (psia)
q Dynamic pressure
TT2 Engine Face Temperature (°R)
TT25 Fan Discharge Temperature (°R)
T3 Compressor discharge temperature
T4 Burner exit temperature
U Control or input vector
xb» ub» zb Base points vectors of state, control and measurement
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